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A Causation Approach To Criminal
Omissions
Arthur Leavenst
This Article examines the scope of criminal laws that impose liability for
failures to prevent a proscribed harm. Traditionally, courts have only
imposed criminal sanctions upon individuals for their failure to act where
the individual has a "legal duty" to prevent a specific harm. Professor
Leavens rejects this conventional approach as being an artificial and ulti
mately unfair way to set the limits ofomission liability. He asserts that in
order for the courts validly to utilize any concept-including "legal
duty"-to define the scope of omission liability, that concept must fairly
reflect the underlying criminal prohibition; namely, that one may not
cause particular harms. He argues that, at least in conventional omission
analysis, "legal duty" is no more than an imperfect proxy for the law's
requirement that there be an appropriate causal relationship between the
omission and the harm before liability is imposed. Professor Leavens con
cludes by suggesting an alternative approach to imposing liability for omis
sions. He recommends eliminating the distinction between acts and
omissions, claiming that it unnecessarily limits the courts' ability fully to
evaluate the chain ofcausality between an actor's conduct and the prohib
ited harm. Instead, he suggests that courts consider the full course of the
actor's conduct in light ofthe commonsense purposes ofthe criminal prohi
bition against causing certain harms. This approach, the Author states,
will ensure that individuals have fair warning of the conduct expected of
them and will avoid inconsistent applications of criminal liability.
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Duke University; J.D. 1976, Harvard Law School. I would like to thank my colleagues Anne
Goldstein, Cathy Jones, Bruce Miller, Dennis Patterson, and Barry Stem for their encouragement
and valuable comments on earlier drafts of this article; Dean Howard Kalodner for providing
assistance through a research grant; Diane De Geiso for assistance with the research; and Laurel
Brandt, my most demanding critic and strongest supporter, for her insightful comments and
constant support.
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INTRODUCTION

Among criminal law's most fundamental prohibitions are those pro
scribing the infliction of a particular harm. I Unlike laws that forbid par
ticular conduct without regard to actual consequences, laws defining
result-oriented crimes such as homicide prohibit the causation of certain
harms without specifying the conduct by which those harms are accom
plished. 2 Because liability for producing certain results does not depend
on how the results were brought about, the law has always imposed crim
inal liability not only for acts that cause harm but also for failures to
prevent harm. 3 Despite this longstanding acceptance, however, the lim
its of criminal liability for omissions have never been well defined.
The conventional approach to criminal omissions defines the limits
of such liability through the concept of duty. The theory is appealingly
simple: if a person has a duty to prevent a harm and fails to do so, he
shall be punished the same as one who affirmatively acts to cause that
harm. It is not so simple, however, to determine which "omitters" have
a duty to act and thus properly are subject to liability for a particular
harm. The doctrinal answer is that criminal law punishes only those
omitters who, at the time of their omission, were under a "legal duty" to
act.4 This approach to defining omission liability is unsatisfactory, for it
1. These prohibitions, sometimes called "crimes of cause-and-result," W. LAFAVE & A.
SCOTI', CRIMINAL LAW 278 (2d ed. 1986), include a broad range of crimes, such as assault and
battery and malicious destruction of property. The most extended and important example of "cause
and-result" liability is the prohibition against criminal homicide, the most basic normative command
of our culture. See G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 341-42 (1978) (observing that
"causing death is perceived as a unique desecration"); see also 4 W. BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES
*177 ("Of crimes injurious to the persons of private subjects, the most principal and important is the
offense of taking away that life which is the immediate gift of the grcat Creator .•.•") (emphasis in
original); Exodus 20:1, 13 ("And the Lord Spoke all these words: ... Thou shalt not kill.").
2. An example of a conduct prohibition is burglary, which forbids unauthorized entry into a
building with the intent to commit a crime. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1 (Offieial Draft
1980). One commits burglary at the moment an act of entry under these circumstances occurs;
liability attaches whether or not the intended crime is actually committed in the building. Id. &
comment at 61. On the other hand, liability for causing a result depends on the occurrenee of the
harmful consequence, however accomplished. Thus the various forms of criminal homicide require
as a predicate for liability that death actually occur, but they do not specify any particular homicidal
acts. See, e.g., id. § 210.1(1) ("A person is guilty of criminal homicide ifhe purposely, knowingly,
recklessly or negligently causes the death of another human being.").
3. Since its earliest stages, Anglo-Ameriean criminal law has recognized some form of
liability for omissions to prevent harms, principally death. See, e.g., 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note
1, at *197; 1 E. EAST, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 264-65 (1803); 1 M. HALE, THE
HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 430-31 (1778); 3 I.F. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 9-11 (1883).
4. E.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(3)(b) (Official Draft 1980) ("Liability for the
commission of an offense may not be based on an omission unaccompanied by action unless ••• a
duty to perform the omitted act is otherwise imposed by law."). See also G. FLETCHER, supra note
1, §§ 8.1-.4; I. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 190-205, 208-11 (2d ed. 1960); W.
LAFAVE & A. SCOTI', supra note 1, at 202-12. For additional background and discussion of
criminal omissions see G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 3-8 (2d ed. 1961);
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is not at all clear what the term "legal duty" means or why it is an apt
criterion of criminal liability. Thus lacking a sound conceptual frame
work for deciding which omissions are criminal, courts have imposed
liability for omissions in a divergent, and at times incoherent, manner.
Two fairly recent cases illustrate the definitional confusion in omis
sions analysis. In Barber v. Superior Court, S the California Court of
Appeals held that doctors have no legal duty to provide food or drink to
certain patients placed in their care. There, the state had brought homi
cide charges against an internist and a surgeon who had discontinued a
comatose patient's intravenous nourishment, allowing him to die. Dis
missing the charges before trial, the court held that the doctors were not
under a legal duty to continue providing the patient with life sustaining
fluids where, in the judgment of both the doctors and the family, there
was no reasonable chance that further treatment would provide the
patient with benefits that outweighed the treatment's burdens. 6 Since the
doctors had no legal duty to continue treatment, the court concluded
that they could stop providing the intravenous fluids without criminal
liability, even though death was certain to result.7
Fletcher, Criminal Omissions: Some Perspectives. 24 AM. J. CoMP. L. 703 (1976)j Frankel, Criminal
Omissions: A Legal Microcosm. 11 WAYNE L. REv. 367 (1965)j Glazebrook, Criminal Omissions:
The Duty Requirement in Offenses Against the Person, 76 LAW Q. REv. 386 (1960)j Hughes,
Criminal Omissions. 67 YALE L.J. 590 (1958)j Kirchheimer, Criminal Omissions, 55 HARV. L. REv.
615 (1942)j Kleinig, Criminal Liability for Failures to Act. LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Summer
1986, at 161j Mack, Bad Samaritanism and the Causation ofHarm. 9 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 230 (1980)j
Robinson, Criminal Liability for Omissions: A BriefSummary and Critique ofthe Law in the United
States. 29 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 101 (1984)j Smith, Liability for Omissions in the Criminal Law. 4
LEGAL STUD. 88 (1984)j Woozley, A Duty to Rescue: Some Thoughts on Criminal Liability. 69 VA.
L. REv. 1273 (1983).
5. 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983).
6. ld. at 1019, 1021-22, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491, 493.
To appreciate the court's reasoning, a brief review of the facts is helpful. After routine surgery,
the patient unexpectedly suffered a massive heart attack, leaving him comatose with severe brain
damage. He was immediately put on life support equipment, but after three days the defendant
doctors and their colleagues concluded that his condition was "likely" permanent. When this
prognosi& was communicated to the family, they requested in writing that the life support equipment
be removed. The doctors acceded, but the patient continued to breathe, showing minimal brain
activity. Two days later, after conSUlting further with the family, the doctors ordered removal of the
nutrition and hydration tubes, and the patient died.
Examining the question of the doctors' legal duty, the court concluded first that standard
medical treatment in this context includes intravenous feeding and hydration, and that removal of
the tubes constituted an omission rather than an affirmative act. ld. at 1016, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
The court then held that whatever duty there may be to begin treatment, there is no duty to continue
treatment once "it has become futile in the opinion of qualified medical personnel." ld. 1018, 195
Cal. Rptr. at 491. The court, however, explicitly declined to set precise guidelines concerning the
difficult questions of when or how this medical determination of futility should be made. ld. In the
absence of legislative guidance, the court left it to the family (as surrogate for the patient) and the
doctors to decide, on the facts of each case, when further treatment would be futile-when it would
have no "reasonable chance of providing benefits to the patient, which benefits outweigh the burdens
attendant to the treatment." ld. at 1019, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
7. ld. at 1022, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
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Whatever sense the Barber decision makes as a matter of medical
practice or even public policy, it is difficult to reconcile with California's
homicide laws. The doctors intentionally starved their patient to death.
Such conduct, unless it is somehow legally justified, falls squarely within
the murder prohibition against intentional killing. 8 The only viable the
ory of justification on these facts would be some variety of euthanasia,
but California law does not recognize any form of legal euthanasia. 9
Nevertheless, the Barber court declined to hold the doctors criminally
liable for their omission, resulting in a troublingly narrow definition of
omission liability.
In contrast, a Maryland trial court in Pope v. State lO adopted a
broad view of "legal duty" which resulted in an expansive imposition of
criminal liability for omissions. In this case, a woman was prosecuted as
a principal for homicide after she stood by in her home and did nothing
to stop an infant's deranged mother from beating her child to death.
Though the trial court ultimately acquitted the woman of the homicide
charges, it refused to dismiss or direct a verdict on those counts, conclud
ing that the defendant was under a legal duty to intercede. Her failure to
do so, if proven to have been accompanied by the necessary intent, could
thus have been the basis for homicide liability. 11
The trial court's holding seems well beyond what society generally
would expect as an enforceable standard of conduct in such circum
stances. While Mrs. Pope's conduct raises serious ethical and moral
8. See CAL. PENAL CoDE § 187 (West Supp. 1988) ("[mlurder is the unlawful kitting of a
human being ... with malice aforethought"); see also infra notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
9. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1012, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 487.
10. 284 Md. 309, 396 A.2d 1054 (1979).
11. The defendant was originally indicted for first degree murder, second degree murder,
manslaughter, felonious child abuse, and accessory-after-the-fact murder, as well as other charges
not here relevant. All were based on the defendant's failure to stop the child's mother from beating
the child to death. Id. at 312 n.l, 396 A.2d at 1057 n.1. Prior to trial, the prosecution nol prossed
the first degree murder count, and the court granted defendant's motion to dismiss the accessory
after-the-fact murder count, but presumably declined to dismiss the remaining charges. Defendant
waived her right to a jury trial and was tried by the court.
The court acquitted her of second degree murder and manslaughter but convicted her of child
abuse. Id. at 312 n.2, 396 A.2d at 1057 n.2. It appears that the court's acquittal of defendant on the
homicide charges was not based on the absence of a legal duty to act because, in convicting her
under the child abuse statute, the court found that the defendant had an affirmative duty to act to
prevent harm to the child. Under Maryland law, a person who is obligated by that statute to protect
a child and who fails to prevent the child's death is guilty of homicide if he or she has the requisitc
intent. See Palmer v. State, 223 Md. 341, 351-52, 164 A.2d 467, 483 (1960). The court therefore
must have acquitted defendant on the homicide counts due to lack of intent, not lack of "legal duty."
On appeal, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals reversed the child abuse conviction, holding
that the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's findings either (1) that the defendant
had a duty to act under the child abuse statute; or (2) that she was an accomplice to the mother's
abuse of the child. 284 Md. at 327, 396 A.2d at 1065-66. The Maryland Court of Appeals granted
f~rther review, affirming the reversal of the child abuse conviction on the same rationale. Id. at 331
33, 396 A.2d at 1067-68.
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questions, it is difficult to think of her failure to act as homicidal. Indeed,
had she been convicted, she may have had a strong claim that she had
been denied fair warning that her conduct constituted criminal homicide.
The disparity between the Barber and Pope holdings demonstrates
the need for coherent and predictable limits to criminal omission liabil
ity. In one instance, a court has held that no legal duty attaches to one
who assumes a position of professional care and then deliberately devi
ates from the established course in rendering that care, while a different
court has imposed a duty to act on one with no formal relation to the
victim and no established practice of providing assistance. The purpose
of this Article, then, is to explore the conceptual basis for punishing
omissions in order to discover reasoned limits for its application. This
Article first examines the conventional doctrine of criminal omissions
and its dependence on the concept of "legal duty." It suggests that the
conventional "legal duty" requirement was developed principally to set
clear limits on imposing omission liability. This approach, however, is
conceptually flawed, for it achieves certainty without regard to the func
tion of the underlying criminal prohibition, which is to punish, and
thereby hopefully to prevent, conduct which produces particular harms.
It follows that criminal liability can only attach to omissions that have
"caused" one of those harms. The proper function of the duty require
ment therefore is not simply to limit liability; rather, its main purpose
should be to define the causal relationship between failures to act and
specific harms. A duty that gives rise to criminal omissions liability
should exist only when the societal expectation of preventive action is so
strong that an omission can be said to have "caused" the proscribed
harm. Under this approach, the content of the otherwise amorphous
"legal duty" concept becomes a function of the common-~ense meaning
of causation, a notion which, if not absolutely precise, is at least concep
tually consistent and in broad contour widely understood. Once the rela
tionship between duty and causation is made explicit, individuals may
modify their behavior accordingly or at least have fair warning when
they will be punished for failing to act.
This Article concludes by proposing an alternative to conventional
criminal omissions analysis. Reliance on duty as a causal link between
an omission and a harm is only necessary if we continue to distinguish
between "acts" and "omissions." This Article suggests that such a dis
tinction is illusory and unhelpful. The act/omission dichotomy is a
product of our inclination to think of causation solely in terms of physi
cal cause and effect. In assessing causal responsibility, we tend to look
only at the conduct that immediately and directly precedes a harm-the
conduct that has "physical impact." Causal concepts, however, need not
be based solely on physical proximity, and thus there is no reason to
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focus exclusively on the actions or inactions that immediately precede a
harm. If we confine our attention only to conduct that temporally and
physically precedes the harm, some conduct will appear omissive. This
characterization, in turn, requires that we apply concepts oflegal duty in
order coherently to address the causation inquiry..If, however, we
examine the whole of a particular actor's course of conduct vis-a-vis a
harm that she is said to have caused, we can assess whether the criminal
prohibition that proscribes that harm fairly applies to her course of con
duct. We thus can avoid the often difficult and arbitrary tasks of deter
mining whether conduct is an "act" or an "omission" and, in the latter
case, whether there is a "legal duty" to act.
I
THE CONVENTIONAL ApPROACH

A.

The Duty Requirement

Early authorities recognized the difficulties of setting precise limits
on criminal liability for failures to act.12 More than 100 years ago, Sir
James Fitzjames Stephen summarized the dilemma in his History of the
Criminal Law of England: "Whether a person, who being able to save
the life of another without inconvenience or risk refuses to do so, even in
order that [the victim] may die, can be said to have killed him is a ques
12. See, e.g., T. MACAULAY, A PENAL CODE PREPARED BY THE INDIAN LAW
CoMMISSIONERS 157-58 (1837); 3 I.F. STEPHEN, supra note 3, at 10. The problems of iII-defined
limits do not arise in all cases of criminal omissions. Legislatures may imposc a duty to act, and the
liability that results from failing to act, assuming sufficient notiee, presents no special problems of
limits or fair warning. For example, taxpayers may be required to file income tax returns on pain of
criminal penalties. 26 U.S.C.A. § 6011 (West Supp. 1987). Similarly, building owners may be
required by statute to protect others by maintaining fire prevention and extinguishing equipment in
public buildings or dwellings. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 13113.7-.8 (West 1984 &
Supp. 1988). People may even be required to take affirmative steps to save the life of someone in
peril. For example, a Vermont statute provides:
.
(a) A person who knows that another is exposed to grave physical harm shall, to the
extent that the same can be rendered without danger or peril to himself or without
interference with important duties owed to others, give reasonable assistance to the
exposed person unless that assistance or care is being provided by others.

(c) A person who willfully violates subsection (a) of this section shall be fined not
more than $100.00.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (1973).
Violations of such specific statutory duties, sometimes called "direct" or "pure" omissions, see,
e.g., I. HALL, supra note 4, at 198-99, lead to criminal liability whenever one fails to eomply with the
statutory duty to act, whether or not any harm results. See also W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note
I, at 202. Direct criminal omissions are not the subject of this Article.
Statutory duties to act can also provide the basis for criminal liability for failure to prevent a
particular harm. For example, a violation of a statute prohibiting child neglect might give rise to
homicide liability if the child dies. See, e.g., Palmer 223 Md. at 351-52, 164 A.2d at 483. Such
duties may be more definite than their common law counterparts, but neither their statutory origin
nor the precision with which they may be defined answers the question of whether any particular
statutory duty to act is properly the basis for criminal liability for failing to prevent a harm.
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tion of words, and also a question of degree.,,13 Authorities agreed from
the outset that there were certain core omissions that were properly
regarded as criminal, perhaps the paradigm being a parent's failure to
rescue his or her child. 14 They also agreed that the law neither could nor
should punish all such omissions. 15 The problem, of course, was where
to draw the line. Stephen framed the issue so:
A man who caused another to be drowned by refusing to hold out his
hand to save him probably would in common language be said to have
killed him, and many similar cases might be put, but the limit of respon
sibility is soon reached. It would hardly be said that a rich man who
allowed a poor man to die rather than give, say £5, which the rich man
would not miss, in order to save his life, had killed him, and though it
might be cowardly not to run some degree of risk for the purpose of
saving the life of another, the omission to do it could hardly be described
as homicide. A number of people who stand round a shallow pond in
which a child is drowning, and let it drown without taking the trouble to
ascertain the depth of the pond, are no doubt, shameful cowards, but
they can hardly be said to have killed the child. 16

As noted, the doctrinal solution to this problem of scope was to pun
13. 3 J.F. STEPHEN, supra note 3, at 10.
14. See, e.g., Regina v. Downes [1875], 1 Q.B.D. 25, 29-30; J. HALL, supra note 4, at 208-09.

Professor Graham Hughes suggests that the concept of criminal liability for a failure to perform a
legal duty came from nineteenth century England, which imposed manslaughter liability on
neglectful parents whose children died, while at the same time confining the duty to render aid so
that it could not be applied generally. Hughes, supra note 4, at 620-21.
15. Some have argued for imposing a general duty to save another's life if the rescue involves
no risk. See J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUcnON TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION
422-23 & n.l ~. Harrison ed. 1948) (1st ed. 1789); 4 E. LIVINGSTON, A SYSTEM OF PENAL LAW
FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA bk IV, tit. II, ch. 3, § 4, arts. 6-7 (Washington 1828)
(categorizing as criminal homicide the failure to prevent another's death if it was possible to do so
without danger of personal injury or pecuniary loss).
Most authorities, however, have followed the approach articulated by Lord Thomas Macaulay,
President of Great Britain's Indian Law Commission, in the Commission's commentary on the
proposed Penal Code for India that the Commission published in 1837. In addressing the problem
of punishing omissions to act, he said:
Two things we take to be evident; first, that some of these omissions ought to be punished
in exactly the same manner in which acts are punished; secondly, that all these omissions
ought not to be punished..• , It is difficult to say whether a penal code which should put
no omissions on the same footing with acts, or a penal code which should put all omissions
on the same footing with acts would produce consequences more absurd and revolting.
There is no country in which either of these principles is adopted. Indeed, it is hard to
conceive how, if either were adopted, society could be held together.
It is plain, therefore, that a middle course must be taken. But it is not easy to
determine what that middle course ought to be. The absurdity of the two extremes is
obvious. But there are innumerable intermediate points; and wherever the line of
demarcation may be drawn it will, we fear, include some cases which we might wish to
exempt, and will exempt some which we might wish to include.
T. MACAULAY, supra note 12, at 158.
16.

3 J.F. STEPHEN, supra note 3, at 10.
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ish the omission only if the actor was under a "legal duty" to act. 17 But
while Stephen pronounced this formulation "a perfectly distinct line" for
identifying those omissions that constitute criminal homicide,18 the
requirement that a duty be legal solves little by itself. "Legal duty" in
this context cannot mean a duty enforceable by the criminal law, for such
a requirement would be tautologica1. 19 Assuming, then, that "legal"
refers to some other body of substantive law, the obvious question, which
has received surprisingly little attention,20 is: what other law?
17. For example, Article 294 of the Indian Penal Code proposed by Macaulay's Commission
provided:
Whoever does any act or omits what he is legally bound to do, with the intention of thereby
causing, or with the knowledge that he is likely thereby to cause the death of any person,
and does by such act or omission cause the death of any person, is said to commit the
offence of "voluntary culpable homicide."
T. MACAULAY, supra note 12, at 67.
In the accompanying commentary, Macaulay was almost apologetic in suggesting "legal duty"
as the criterion for whether omissions should carry homicide liability:
But it is with great diffidence that we bring forward our own proposition. It is open to
objections: cases may be put in which it will operate too severely, and cases in which it will
operate too leniently: but we are unable to devise a better.
What we propose is this, that where acts are made punishable on the ground that they
have caused, or have been intended to cause, or have been known to be likely to cause a
certain evil effect, omissions which have caused, which have been intended to cause, or
which have been known to be likely to cause the same effect, shall be punishable in the
same manner; provided that such omissions were, on other grounds, illegal. An omission is
illegal ... if it be an offence, if it be a breach of some direction of law, or if it be such a
wrong as would be a good ground for a civil action.

We are sensible that in some of the cases which we have put our rule may appear too
lenient. But we do not think that it can be made more severe, without disturbing the whole
order of society.
Id. at 159. In the end, he defended his "legal duty" proposal morc for the certainty it provided than
for the appropriateness of punishing particular persons:
It is evident that to attempt to punish men by law for not rendering to others all the service
to which it is their duty to render to others would be preposterous. We must grant impu
nity to the vast majority of those omissions which a benevolent morality would pronounce
reprehensible, and must content ourselves with punishing such omissions only when they
are distinguished from the rest by some circumstance which marks them out as peculiarly
fit objects of penal legislation. Now, no circumstance appears to us so well fitted to be the
mark as the circumstance which we have selected. It will generally be found in the most
atrocious cases of omission: it will scarcely ever be found in a venial case of omission: and
it is more clear and certain than any other mark that has occurred to us. That there are
objections to the line which we propose to draw, we have admitted. But there are objec
tions to every line which can be drawn, and some line must be drawn.
[d. at 160. See also I. HALL, supra note 4, at 190-93; Frankel, supra note 4, at 376-84; Hughes, supra
note 4, at 620-27.
The Model Penal Code adopts this same legal duty formula in its omissions provision, albeit
somewhat more generally. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(3) (Official Draft 1980).
18. 3 I.F. STEPHEN, supra note 3, at 10.
19. See I. HALL, supra note 4, at 193; Frankel, supra note 4, at 369; Hughes, supra note 4, at
620.
20. The commentary to the Model Penal Code typifies the off-handed treatment usually given
the duty requirement.
3. Omissions. Subsection (3) states the conventional position with respect to omissions
unaccompanied by action as a basis of liability. Unless the omission is expressly made
sufficient by the law defining the offense, a duty to perform the omitted act must have been
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One answer would be to look to the civil law as a solution; Stephen,
along with his influential contemporary Lord Thomas B. Macaulay, pro
posed that a "legal duty" is any civilly enforceable obligation. 21 Unfortu
nately, the civil law definitions of various duties, taken principally from
tort and contract, are of little help in the criminal context. Even assum
ing general agreement on what duties should be civilly enforceable, crim
inallaw makes no pretense of enforcing all such duties. 22
The courts' reluctance to enforce criminally all civil duties is appro
priate. Given that contract and tort law is primarily compensatory, it
would be absurd to suggest that every breach of a civilly imposed duty
should also be criminally punished if that breach has led to a criminally
proscribed harm. 23 Suppose, for example, that a paving contractor is late
delivering the asphalt necessary to repair a road that provides the princi
pal means of access to a hospital. Few would suggest that the contractor
is guilty of manslaughter if an ambulance is thereby delayed, resulting in
the death of a heart attack victim.24 Similarly, if a police officer stops a
drunk driver but permits him to go on his way, neither the officer-nor
the town that employs her-is guilty of homicide if the driver later kills
himself in a collision, even if the officer was negligent in failing to detain
otherwise imposed by law for the omission to have the same standing as a voluntary act for
purposes of liability. [Footnote: The "duty imposed by law" may be a statutory duty, a
contractual duty, or a duty arising from tort law.] It should, of course, suffice, as the
courts now hold, that the duty arise under some branch of the civil law. If it does, this
minimal requirement is satisfied.
It is arguable that focus on civil duty should not be the crucial criterion for whether
an omission can be the basis of crimina1liability, but that standard is the one that best deals
with most situations in which criminal liability would clearly be appropriate and also gives
adequate warning of what omissions may be the basis of such liability. [Footnote: It is
possible that developments in the law of torts could render this standard much more open
ended than it presently is.] It is also arguable that affirmative duties to act should be
enlarged in scope, especially when action is required to prevent bodily injury. This is a
problem to be faced, however, in the definition of particular offenses, not in this section of
the Code.
MODEL PENAL CoDE § 2.01(3) comment 3 (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1985) (footnotes in
original) (some footnotes omitted).
21. T. MACAULAY, supra note 12, at 159; 3 J.F. STEPHEN, supra note 3, at 10.
22. See. e.g.• J. HALL, supra note 4, at 193; Hughes. supra note 4, at 620; cf. G. WILLIAMS,
supra note 4, at 7 (arguing that criminal law should not be used to enforce civil duties).
23. See G. FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 616. H.L.A. Hart, in discussing the difference between
criminal and civil law, suggests that while the criminal law has basically a command function,
establishing generalized rules of conduct that are either obeyed or not, other legal rules do not have
this command feature as their primary characteristic. Their function is to facilitate the realization of
mostly private choices and goals by providing a meehanism through which individuals can structure
rights and duties. H.L.A. HART, Positivism and the Separation 0/ Law and Morals. in EssAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 49, 60-61 (1983).
24. See. e.g.• Regina v. Pocock, 117 Eng. Rep. 1194, 1196 (1851) (local trustces appointed to
repair roads held not indictable for manslaughter even though their neglect of this duty resulted in
an injury due to the poor condition of one such road); see also Williams, Causation in Homicide.
1957 CRIM. L. REv. 429, 434-35 (commenting on Pocock). But see Frankel, supra note 4, at 384-390
(arguing that legal duties constitute objective societal expectations and thus are an appropriate basis
for both legal and moral culpability).
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h1IIl.
Stephen suggested that liability be limited to the neglect of those
civilly enforceable duties aimed at preserving life. 26 While this approach
may narrow the problem somewhat, it does not eliminate it. First, it is
by no means clear what constitutes a "life-preserving" duty or when it
attaches. 27 The police officer in the above hypothetical surely is under
some general duty to preserve life, but we still feel uncomfortable about
imposing homicide liability for her failure to detain the drunk. More
over, to limit our attention to life-saving duties that are independently
enforceable under civil law arbitrarily limits the scope of criminal omis
sions; there may be appropriate duties to preserve life that are not civilly
enforceable. 28
25. As Glanville Williams suggests, imposing criminal liability (in most cases, homicide) on
public servants for failure to execute properly their public duties seems too severe a penalty. See
Williams, supra note 24, at 435; see also Frankel, supra note 4, at 399 & n.104 (concluding that,
although not an easy case, a police officer should not suffer a manslaughter conviction when neglect
of his or her duty leads to a death, because such punishment would be "inexpedient").
Of course, to the extent public servants act outside the proper scope of their duties and cause
harm such as death, they may be subject to criminal prosecution. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 3.07 & comment 3(c) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985) Qimiting a public officer's
authority to use deadly force). In appropriate cases, public officials and the governmental bodies
that employ them may also suffer civil liability for harms caused by their neglect of duty. See, e.g.,
Irwin v. Town of Ware, 392 Mass. 745,467 N.E.2d 1292 (1984) (holding that a town may be liable
for wrongful death damages as a result of police officer's failure to detain a drunk driver who
subsequently struck and killed a man and his child).
26. See 3 J.F. STEPHEN, supra note 3, at 10 ("Hence, in order to ascertain what kinds of killing
by omission are criminal, it is necessary, in the first place, to ascertain the duties which tcnd to the
preservation of life.").
27. Stephen presents his complete list of sueh duties:
A duty in certain cases to provide the necessaries of life; a duty to do dangerous acts in a
careful manner, and to employ reasonable knowledge, skill, care, and caution therein; a
duty to take proper precautions in dealing with dangerous things; and a duty to do any act
undertaken to be done, by contract or otherwise, the omission of which would be
dangerous to life.
Id. As a tool for predicting what duties give rise to criminal liability, however, Stephen's list helps
little. For example, it is not clear how one decides prospectively which contractual duties are "dan
gerous to life" if unperformed. Would the contract to repave a road fall into that category, given
that every road is part of the shortest route to the ncarest hospital for some people?
28. Indeed, Stephen'S list of life-preserving duties, sec supra note 27, seems to include examples
of life-preserving duties that are not civilly enforceable. Last on Stephen's list is a "duty to do any
act undertaken to be done, by contract or otherwise, the omission of which would be dangerous to
life." Id. If a person gratuitously undertook to provide food so that another could avoid starvation,
but then withdrew or terminated that offer of assistance before completion, that offer likely would
not be civilly enforceable (assuming no alternative source of the food and thus no detrimental
reliance). Nevertheless, this gratuitons undertaking fits within Stephen's list of circumstances that
give rise to life-preserving duties.
This example is by no means far-fetched. In Regina v. Iustan [1893] I Q.B.450, 1891-94 All
E.R. 1213, the court held that, despite the Iaek of evidence implying a contract for care, a niecc
living with her elderly aunt was properly convicted of manslaughter for failing to fced or seek
treatment when the aunt fell ill and subsequently died. For a further discussion of Instan, see infra
notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
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In the end, any effort to squeeze civil duties, life-saving or otherwise,
into a mold categorically suitable for defining criminal omission liability
must fail, because there is no conceptual link between such duties and the
underlying criminal prohibition against causing harm. On the other
hand, it is easy to appreciate the temptation to look to the civil law as a
way to limit criminal omission liability, because such a "legal duty"
requirement seems, at least on the surface, both easy to understand and
far superior to having no limiting principle at all. But, as pointed out
above, relying on external sources of law to detennine which omissions
are criminal not only is conceptually unsatisfactory, but also leads to
decisional confusion and unfairness.
B.

Conventional Sources of Legal Duties

The courts have avoided, to some extent, the problems that result
from ambiguity in the meaning of ''legal duty" by applying that concept
conservatively in the criminal context.29 Five or six categories have
emerged from the decisions. These duties already have been extensively
cataloged in the literature,30 but for our purposes they bear summarizing:
(1) Duty based on relationship. Relationships in which one party
depends on the other to provide care often give rise to a criminally
enforceable duty to provide such care. Examples of duties arising from a
person's status include a parent's duty to provide minor children with
necessities31 and protection,32 a duty to care for one's spouse,33 and a
ship captain'~ duty to aid his or her crew. 34
(2) Duty arising from contract. An express contract to provide serv
ices creates an obligation to perfonn those services properly. Where
those services are closely related to protecting or caring for dependent
29. As one commentator put it, "[t]he duty to act is obvious when the law adopts only moral
convictions the acceptance of which has never been denied within the community, as, for instance, in
the duties arisiug from the relation between parents and children." Kirchheimer, supra note 4, at
621.
30. See, e.g., W. LAFAVE & A. Scon, supra note I, at 203-07; Kirchheimer, supra note 4, at
621-36; Robinson, supra note 4, at 112-18.
31. E.g., Commonwealth v. Michaud, 389 Mass. 491, 496, 451 N.E.2d 396, 399 (1983) (duty to
provide food); People v. Lynch, 47 Mich. App. 8, 16-17 & n.7, 208 N.W.2d 656,660 & n.7 (1973)
(same); Commonwealth v. Barnhart, 345 Pa. Super. 10, 18-19,497 A.2d 616, 620-21 (1985) (duty to
obtain medical aid); State v. Bames, 141 Tenn. 469, 471-72, 212 S.W. 100, 100-101 (1919) (same);
State v. Williams, 4 Wash. App. 908, 912, 484 P.2d 1167, 1170-71 (1971) (same).
32. E.g., State v. Palmer, 223 Md. 341, 343, 351-52, 164 A.2d 467, 468, 473 (1960) (mother's
duty to proteet child from abusive boyfriend); Commonwealth v. Howard, 265 Pa. Super. 535, 538,
402 A.2d 674, 676 (1979) (same); Rex v. Russell 1933 Vict. L.R. 59 (father's duty to proteet children
from mother, who was drowning them).
33. E.g., State v. Mally, 139 Mont. 599, 605-06, 366 P.2d 868, 871-72 (1961) (husband's duty
to provide medical attention for helpless wife); Commonwcalth v. Konz, 498 Pa. 639, 644-46, 450
A.2d 638, 641-42 (1982) (wife's duty to provide medical assistance for husband recognized but held
not to extend to circumstances in which husband expressly declines such assistance).
34. E.g., United States v. Knowles, 26 F. Cas. 800, 802 (N.D. Cal. 1864) (No. 15,540).
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persons, courts have imposed criminal liability when a failure to provide
the services leads to a prohibited harm such as death.3s Further, at least
one court has found, in the absence of an express agreement, an implied
contract to provide necessities or essential care to a dependent person
that give rise to a legal duty to provide such care. 36
(3) Duty of landowner and duty to control others. These two duties
are based on related tort principles. Although the cases are few, viola
tion of the landowner's duty to keep safe premises or the master's duty to
ensure that his or her servants do not injure others can, in appropriate
circumstances, lead to criminalliability.37
(4) Duty arising from creation ofperil If a person acts culpably to
imperil another, he or she has a legal duty to rescue the victim. 38 The
cases are split on whether a duty to rescue arises if someone innocently or
accidentally imperils another. 39
35. E.g.• Jones v. United States, 308 F.2d 307, 310 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (longterm baby·sitter
under duty to feed infant); State v. Brown, 129 Ariz. 347, 350, 631 P.2d 129, 131·32 (Ct. App. 1981)
(operator of boarding home under duty to feed and care for elderly patient); People v. Montecino, 66
Cal. App. 2d 85, 100-01, 152 P.2d 5, 13 (1944) (private home-care nurse under duty to provide or
obtain necessary medieal care for elderly patient). Although most contract cases involve a duty
owed to a contracting party, the legal duties enforceable at criminal law may in some circumstances
extend to third parties. See. e.g., State v. O'Brien, 32 NJ.L. 169, 172 (1867) (railroad switchman's
obligation as an employee to do his job properly extended to the public).
36. See Davis v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 201, 335 S.E.2d 375 (1985). In Davis. an adult
woman lived with her totally disabled elderly mother. The mother had given written authorization
for her daughter to obtain and use food stamps on her behalf and to receive, as her representative,
her social security benefits, which were used to pay both the mother's and the daughter's household
expenses. The daughter also had informed a number of persons that it was her responsibility to
provide total care for her mother. ld. at 203-04, 335 S.E.2d at 377. When the mother died of
exposure and starvation, the daughter was prosecuted and convicted of homicide for failing to
provide such care. The trial court found an implied contract between the daughter and her mother
sufficient to convict the daughter of involuntary manslaughter. ld. at 205, 335 S.E.2d at 378.
37. E.g., Brown, 129 Ariz. at 350, 631 P.2d at 132 (owner of boarding home under criminally
enforceable legal duty both to ensure that the premises are being safely operated and to see that
employees are able to, and actually do, provide necessary care); Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316
Mass. 383, 397, 55 N.E.2d 902, 909 (1944) (nightclub operator under criminally enforceable
obligation to provide safe premises for patrons). For a detailed discussion of Weiansky, see Infra
notes 139-43 and accompanying text. Cf. State v. Reitze, 86 N.J.L. 407, 409, 92 A. 576, 577 (1914)
(recoguizing a possible duty of innkeepers to ensure that guests arc not injured on hotel premises, but
holding that even if such a duty exists, defendant was not criminally liable for failure to escort a
drunken patron to his wagon where he fell and broke his neck).
38. E.g.• Flippo v. State, 258 Ark. 233, 238, 523 S.W.2d 390, 393 (1975) (man who negligently
shot another in hunting accident under a duty to seek medieal aid for victim); Jones v. State, 220
Ind. 384, 387, 43 N.E.2d 1017, 1018 (1942) (defendant under duty to save a girl who had fallen into
a stream while running from defendant after he had forcibly raped her); see Reitze, 86 N.J.L. at 409·
10,92 A. at 577-78 (holding that while an innkeeper was statutorily prohibited from serving further
alcohol to an intoxicated patron, he could not be held criminally liable for a death for failure to
discharge this "duty" properly).
39. Compare Commonwealth v. Cali, 247 Mass. 20, 24-25, 141 N.E. 510, 511 (1923)
(defendant under duty to try to extinguish a fire that he accidentally set to his house and thus was
guilty of arson when he did not) with King v. Commonwealth, 285 Ky. 654, 659,148 S.W.2d 1044,
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(5) Duty arising from voluntary assumption of care. This category
of legal duty is often the trickiest, because some of the "duties" that have
been so categorized are not clearly "legal," and thus it requires a more
extended discussion. Under ordinary tort principles, a passerby who
offers assistance to an accident victim must proceed with due caution and
care in rendering that aid.40 A volunteer's culpable failure to act, once
she has begun to help, violates that "legal duty" of care. If it leads to a
criminal hann, she could be charged with a criminal omission.41 More
problematic are the cases in which the volunteer apparently does nothing
at all to fulfill an assumption of care. For example, if a rich man volun
teers to feed a starving beggar but changes his mind before giving any
aid, does he become criminally responsible if the beggar subsequently
dies of starvation? Under the conventional approach, he would not. The
tort principles used above would not apply, since the "volunteer" had not
actually provided any assistance. Further, contract law would not bind
the volunteer, since even if there were some sort of offer and acceptance,
the agreement, being wholly executory, would not be enforceable unless
supported by consideration or detrimental reliance. 42
Most courts, implicitly following the notion of detrimental reliance,
have limited this fonn of legal duty to situations in which, after volunta
rily assuming care, the volunteer acts in a way that deters others from
rendering aid. 43 In the above example, if the rich man's offer caused
another willing rescuer to desist, he would be under a legal duty to fulfill
his gratuitous pledge of aid because the deprivation of other assistance
places the victim in a more vulnerable position than before.44
1047 (1941) (defendant who, in lawful defense of a third person, shot and wounded an attacker was
under no duty to seek medical attention for the wounded assailant).
40. Though a passerby is not required to offer assistance, the volunteer who nevertheless
renders aid is liable in tort if he either intentionally or negligently worsens the injured party's
situation. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS 378-82 (5th ed. 1984).
41. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 1, at 205-06. Lest this seem too harsh for the
good samaritan, recall that criminal homicide requires not only an act or omission, but also the mens
rea of at least culpable negligence. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CoDE §§ 2.02(2)(d), 210.1 (Official
Draft 1980).
42. REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACIS §§ 17, 90 (1981). See supra note 36 and
accompanying text for discussion of duty arising from implied contract.
43. E.g., Jones v. United States, 308 F.2d 307, 310 (D.C. Cir. 1962) ("where one has
voluntarily assumed the eare of another and so secluded the helpless person as to prevent others
from rendering aid" there is a "legal duty" to provide the care).
44. E.g., Flippo v. State, 258 Ark. 233, 238, 523 S.W.2d 390, 393 (1975) (defendant who
assured a shooting victim's father that he would call an ambulance, thus causing the father not to
seek help, is under a legal duty to seek help as quickly as possible).
Purely as a matter of contract law, it is not clear that a gratuitous offer of assistance becomes
specifically enforceable simply because the victim is made worse offby nonperformance. At least in
the case of the starving beggar, there may not have been any act of forbearance by the offeree, even
though another rescuer unilaterally turned away once it seemed apparent that there was no longer a
need for help. The case may not, therefore, fit exactly into the mold of detrimental reliance under
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There remain a few voluntary assumption of care cases involving
neither badly rendered care nor a detrimentally secluded victim. In these
cases, perhaps the most famous being Regina v. Instan,4S intuition sug
gests a duty that has no clear source in external law. In Instan, an
elderly aunt lived with and provided for her niece. Initially, the aunt was
healthy and self-sufficient, but she became ill and eventually immobilized
by gangrene in her leg. The jury apparently found that the niece had
agreed to care or seek assistance for her aunt. 46 The niece neither pro
vided nor sought the necessary help, and the aunt subsequently died from
complications. The appellate court affirmed the niece's conviction for
manslaughter, holding that under the circumstances she had failed to
fulfill a legal duty to care for her aunt. 47
To support its finding of a legal duty, the court did not rely on any
explicit external law such as contract. 48 Rather, the court derived a legal
duty out of what it saw as the clear moral obligation of the niece:
A legal common law duty is nothing else than the enforcing by law of
that which is a moral obligation without legal enforcement. There can be
no question in this case that it was the clear duty of the prisoner to
impart to the deceased so much as was necessary to sustain life of the
contract law. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981). Nevertheless, in
contributing to the victim's peril by secluding him or her from other possible sources of aid, the
person who voluntecrs to assist seems akin to one who creates peril and thus has a duty to rescue.
See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text. In any event, in cases of serious criminal harm,
voluntary assumption of care coupled with the seelusion of the victim seems entirely acceptable as a
predictable and sensible basis for a duty to act enforceable at criminal law . See G. FLETCHER, supra
note I, § 8.3.3; Kirchheimer, supra note 4, at 62l.
45. [1893] I Q.B.450, 1891-94 All E.R. 1213.
46. The court instructed the jury that if it found, under the circumstances, that the defendant
niece had impliedly undertaken either to attend to her aunt or to communicate her aunt's helpless
condition to persons outside the house, they could convict. Id. at 452, 1891-94 All E.R. at 1213-14.
In view of the guilty verdict, the jury presumably found such an undertaking.
47. Id. at 454, 1891-94 All E.R. Rep. at 1214.
48. A close reading of the case supports the conclusion that the niece was under no contractual
duty, express or implied, to assist her aunt. Although the jury apparently found that the niece had
undertaken to care for her aunt, it also appears that this undertaking was imp liable only after her
aunt lay helpless on her deathbed. Id. at 452, 1891-94 All E.R. at 1213-14. In such circumstanees,
the aunt presumably would have been unable to seek help elsewhere and thus unable to claim
detrimental reliance sufficient to serve as a substitute for consideration. Similarly, if the niece's
undertaking oceurred when the aunt was already bedridden in a place where she could not receive
visitors, it is difficult to charge defendant with responsibility for secluding her from other possible
aid. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
Furthermore, if, as it appears, the aunt had been providing her nieee with room and board as a
gift, a deathbed undertaking by the niece to provide some assistance to her benefactor would not
have converted that past benefit to valid consideration that would have rendered the undertaking
specifically enforceable. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 86 comments a, e (1981).
Other commentators similarly have read Instan as other than a contract duty case. See G.
FLETCHER, supra note I, at 615 (contract, if there was one, is important only as evidenee of an
undertaking of care by the niece); Robinson, supra note 4, at 116 & n.85 (duty based on "relationship
of mutual reliance").
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food which she from time to time took in, and which was paid for by the
deceased's own money for the purpose of the maintenance of herself and
the prisoner; it was only through the instrumentality of the prisoner that
the deceased could get the food. There was, therefore, a common law
duty imposed upon the prisoner which she did not discharge.
The prisoner was under a moral obligation to the deceased from
which arose a legal duty towards her; that legal duty the prisoner has
willfully and deliberately left unperformed, with the consequence that
there has been an acceleration of the death of the deceased. owing to the
non~performance of that legal duty.49

The case thus states a duty to aid a helpless person founded on the
moral imperative of the victim's glaring need and the relative ease with
which aid could be rendered. 50 This duty, although yielding what to the
court was plainly the correct result, departs from the conventional
approach of limiting criminal omission liability to those instances in
which the duty is otherwise legally enforceable. While avoiding the
rigidity that results from reliance on extemallaw as a source for duty,
Instan's dependence on "moral obligation" to define omission liability
resurrects the definitional uncertainty that the legal duty doctrine was
intended to avoid.
49. Instan. [1893] 1 Q.B. at 453-54, 1891-94 All E.R. at 1214.
50. Professor Graham Hughes sees this decision as the high-water mark of the law's reflection
of progressive social values. See Hughes, supra note 4, at 621 & n.112.
In similar cases, other courts have insisted on a more restrictive approach to duty, even though
the results can be stark in their lack of humanity. The most famous such case is People v. Beardsley,
150 Mich. 206, 113 N.W. 1128 (1907), concerning a married man who had spent the weekend at
home engaged in a drunken tryst with his mistress. When, at the end of the weekend, the woman
ingested some morphine tablets and passed into a stupor, the man removed her to a nearby
apartment so that his returning wife would not discover her. The woman never regained
consciousness and subsequently died. Yet, the Michigan Supreme Court set aside the man's
manslaughter conviction for his failure to seek aid. The court held that defendant's moral obligation
to care for the stricken woman was not a legal duty because the deceased ''was a woman past 30
years of age .•. had becn twice married ... [and was] accustomed to visiting saloons and to the use
ofintoxicants." Further, "it appear[ed] that she went upon this carouse with respondent voluntarily,
and so continued to remain with him." Id. at 214, 113 N.W. at 1131.
This court's reading of "legal duty" seems crimped at best. The court easily could have based a
"legal duty" on the defendant's responsibility as a host, coupled with his subsequent act of secreting
the woman's unconscious body for the specific purpose of preventing her detection. See supra notes
37 & 43-44 and accompanying text. Thc decision has been roundly criticized, although more for its
outcome than its failure to find an appropriate category of duty. See. e.g.• Hughes, supra note 4, at
624 ("In its savage proclamation that the wages of sin is death, [Beardsley] ignores any impulse of
charity and compassion. It proclaims a morality which is smug, ignorant and vindictive.").
While Beardsley has attracted the most attention, there have been other cases in which courts
have found no legal duty to rescue on the part of a person who fails to rescue a suddenly endangered
companion during the course ofa mutual endeavor. E.g.• State v. Berry, 36 N.M. 318, 323,14 P.2d
434,437 (1932) (holding mountain travelers under no duty to rescue companion who fell off a sled in
a blizzard and froze to death).
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Limitations of the Conventional Approach

Instan, then, highlights the conceptual limitations of the conven
tional approach. In core cases, relying on the notion of legal duty to
define omission liability seems acceptable, for it provides a measure of
certainty without violating our intuitive sense of how people ought to act.
But in the more difficult cases such as Instan, in which deep-rooted
moral sensibilities can be offended by the strict legal duty result, conven
tional analysis provides no conceptual aid to inform the decision on lia
bility. We are left with the bald choice between the rigid but predictable
legal duty formulation on the one hand, and the unpredictable but flexi
ble moral duty approach on the other.
Such duty analysis, however, creates a false choice, for both these
alternatives suffer from the same fundamental defect: neither considers
any conceptual link between the duty requirement and the causal nature
of the criminal prohibition in which omission liability necessarily arises.
Both ignore the critical underlying premise that criminal omissions can
occur only in "cause-and-result" crimes, that is, crimes that proscribe the
causation of a particular harm. Any concept-including duty-utilized
to define the limits of such omission liability must fairly reflect the ele
ment of causation. Rather than searching for a duty cognizable in some
external body of law, as does the conventional doctrine, or based on
vague moral intuition, as does Instan, the key to determining criminal
omission liability lies in deciding which omissions can fairly be said to
cause prohibited harms. Quite simply, that is the essence of the criminal
prohibition giving rise to omission liability.
II
OMITTERS AS "CAUSERS"

The notion that a failure to act can "cause" a result at first blush
sounds odd, and some have suggested that the very idea of causation
analysis is misplaced in the omissions context. 51 Such an argument is
51. See. e.g.• Bradley v. State, 79 Fla. 651, 655-56, 84 So. 677, 679 (1920) (manslaughter
conviction of father based on his failure to seek medical attention for burned child reversed on
grounds that the child's death was caused by the bums and not by the lack of treatment); State v.
Lowe, 66 Minn. 296, 299-300, 68 N.W. 1094, 1095-96 (1896) (third degree murder conviction based
on defendant's failure to fulfill his contractual obligation to obtain medical treatment for woman
during and after childbirth reversed because it was not alIeged that the defendant's neglect had
caused the woman's fatal illness); see also Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis a/Tort
Liability. 56 U. PA. L. REV. 217, 220-21 (1908):
In cases of passive inaction plaintiff is in reality no worse off at alI. His situation is
unchanged; he is merely deprived of a protection which, had it been afforded him, would
have benefited him.... [B]y failing to interfere in the plaintifi's affairs, the defendant has
left him just as he was before; no better off, it is true, but still in no worse position; he has
failed to benefit him, but he has not caused him any new injury nor created any new
injurious situation.
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merely semantic. Of course, there are failures to act that cannot be said
to have caused ensuing harms, but there are other omissions that just as
plainly are the cause of proscribed harms. The parent who fails to feed
his or her infant, allowing the child to die of starvation, has without a
doubt caused that death. S2 The problem, then, is to develop a coherent
way to distinguish between those omissions that "cause" harm and those
that do not.
Let us examine a situation similar to Stephen's hypothetical drown
ing child case. S3 Assume that four able-bodied men, A, B, C, and D, are
standing beside a pool in which a young girl is obviously drowning. One
of them, A, is a stranger who has just pushed the child into the pool.
Each could easily have saved the child but none does, and the child
drowns. Assuming mens rea and lack ofjustification on the part of each,
A is liable for homicide because his push caused the child to die in the
water. If the other men are similarly to be liable for homicide, it must be
because their respective failures to rescue the child also caused her death.
It is plain that if any of the observers had pulled the child out before
her lungs filled with water, the criminal harm of death would not have
occurred. The failure of each to do so is thus a "cause in fact,"S4 an
antecedent condition "but for" which the child's death would not have
occurred. ss If causing a particular result is a crime, the actor must have
The view that, due to apparent lack of physical impact, an omission to act cannot cause a result
was developed fully by early German commentators. See Ryu, Causation in Criminal Law, 106 U.
PA. L. REv. 773, 779 & n.35 (1958) and sources cited therein. It also appeared in the developing
stages of English criminal theory. See Frankel, supra note 4, at 373 & nn.19-20; Williams, supra note
24, at 434.
This argument occasionally surfaces today, although typically in a more sophisticated and nar
row form. See, e.g., G. FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 371:
It was not until the mid-nineteenth century that Anglo-American courts began to convict
persons of criminal homicide for failing to render aid and letting another person die. These
are cases ..• where the actor is liable even though he has not caused the death of the
victim. Of course, a bystander may cause death in the trivial sense that ''but for" his
failure to act, the victim would not have died. But there is no causing of death in the sense
implicit in the tradition of homicidal tainting.
(citing Regina v. Instan, [1893] 1 Q.B. 450, 1891-94 All E.R. 1213, discussed supra text accompany
ing notes 45-50).
52. E.g.• Regina v. Downes [1875] 1 Q.B.D. 25, 29-30; see also Kirchheimer, supra note 4, at
621 & nn.26-27. Even Professor Fletcher, who argues that failures to act do not cause harms in the
same direct sense as what he calls affirmative acts, see infra note 99, apparently concedes that a
parent who starves his or her child directly causes its death. See G. FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 601.
To argue that lack of food, not the omission, caused the death is to argue that the bullet in the brain
caused the death, not the person who shot it.
53. See supra text accompanying note 16.
54. See. e.g.• Williams, supra note 24, at 430-31.
55. See. e.g.• Mueller, Causing Criminal Harm. in EsSAYS IN CRIMINAL SCIENCE 169,173 (G.
and D
Mueller ed. 1961). Of course, this analysis assumes the ability of the potential rescuers B.
to prevent the child's drowning. If any is unable to do so, due to personal or external circumstances,
his failure to intercede would not be a "but for" cause of the child's death. See W . LAFAVE & A.
SCOTT, supra note 1, at 210.
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caused the result in this factual or "but for" sense in order to be held
liable.56 Causation in Anglo-American criminal law, however, requires
more than just "but for" causation. 57 By applying a variety of theories of
proximate cause, the law differentiates among the many possible "but
for" causal forces, identifying some as "necessary conditions"-neces
sary for the result to occur but not its direct "cause"-and recognizing
others as the "direct" or "proximate" cause of the result. 58 The law of
proximate cause thus attributes causal responsibility for a criminal harm
to some acts but not others even though the harm in question could only
have resulted from all of the conduct taken together.
While much of proximate cause analysis has been framed in lan
guage that rings of actual or physical causation,59 this inquiry is hardly
objective. On the contrary, the selective dissociation of particular actors
from results to which their actions have been "but for" causes is neces
sarily an evaluative determination. 6O In understanding how courts
56. See MODEL PENAL CoDE § 2.03 & note (Official Draft 1985); J. HALL, supra note 4, at
282-83; H.L.A. HART & T. HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 109-29 (2d ed. 1985); W. LAFAVE &
A. SCOTT, supra note 1, at 278-81; see also Commonwealth v. Fox, 73 Mass. (7 Gray) 585, 586-87
(1857) (conviction of defendant for murdering his ill wife requires proof that the death would not
have occurred at the time but for his assault and battery).
57. See J. HALL, supra note 4, at 282-84; H.L.A. HART & T. HONORE, supra note 56, at 110
11; W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 1, at 278, 281-83; Mueller, supra note 55, at 173, 186-87;
Williams, supra note 24, at 430, 433-34; see also People v. Warner-Lambert Co., 51 N.Y.2d 295, 304
06,414 N.E.2d 660, 665-66, 434 N.Y.S.2d 159, 164-65 (1980) (simple "but for" causation insufficient
to show criminal liability for employee deaths in plant explosion), cert. denied. 450 U.S. 1031 (1981).
58. See 2 J. BISHOP, BISHOP ON CRIMINAL LAW §§ 637-639 (9th ed. 1923); J. HALL, supra
note 4, at 257-84; H.L.A. HART & T. HONORE, supra note 56, cbs. 12-14; W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT,
supra note 1, at 287-99; 1 F. WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 751 (7th ed. 1874); Ryu, supra note 51, at 784-86; see also People v. Calvaresi, 188 Colo.
277,283,534 P.2d 316, 319 (1975) (physician's negligent treatment of nonmortal shooting wound is
not a "supervening cause" relieving the defendant shooter of causal responsibility for the victim's
death, though recklessness would be a defense) superseded by statute as reported in People v. Bettis,
43 Colo. App. 104, 106, 602 P.2d 877, 878 (1979); State v. Cox, 82 Idaho 150, 155, 351 P.2d 472,
474-75 (1960) (fact that a physician might have treated a collision victim more skillfully is not an
"efficient intervening cause" that would relieve defendant driver of eausal responsibility for the
victim's death); Stephenson v. State, 205 Ind. 141, 187-90, 179 N.E. 633, 649-50 (1932) (victim'S
taking of poison following vicious assault and rape was act of an irresponsible person and thus not
the "voluntary intervening act" of a responsible actor that would relieve defendant of causal
responsibility for the victim's subsequent death), writ oferror dismissed. 205 Ind. 194, 186 N.E. 293
(1933); Hubbard v. Commonwealth, 304 Ky. 818, 822, 202 S.W.2d 634, 636-37 (1947) (defendant's
actions in resisting arrest, which so excited the arresting officer that the officer died of a heart attack,
held "too remote" to be the cause of death); People v. Kibbe, 35 N.Y.2d 407,413,321 N.E.2d 773,
776-77, 362 N.Y.S.2d 848, 852 (1974) (defendant's act of leaving an underclothed, helplessly
drunken robbery victim on an icy road late at night held a "sufficiently direct eause" of the victim's
death when he was subsequently struck and killed by a truck); State v. Johnson, 56 Ohio St. 2d 35,
40-41, 381 N.E.2d 637, 640-41 (1978) (physician's removal of a brain dead assault victim from a
respirator not an "independent intervening cause" that would relieve the defendant of causal
responsibility for the victim's death).
59. See cases cited supra note 58.
60. See. e.g.• MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03 & comment (Official Draft 1985); Ryu, supra note
51, at 783-84. Any idea that the proximate cause inquiry is factual or objective vanished under the
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decide whether and to what extent a failure to act is the legal cause of a
harm, it is important to explore the nature and purpose of this evaluative
approach to causal attribution.

A.

Proximate Cause

Theoretically, criminal law could abandon the concept of proximate
cause, relying simply on "but for" causation to establish causal responsi
bility for criminal harms. The doctrine of mens rea and the voluntariness
and responsibility doctrines of actus reus would then determine which
causal agents of a particular harm should bear the criminal responsibil
ity.61 Popular notionS of causation, however, are not so expansive, and
to rely exclusively on a but for approach in determining causal responsi
bility in cause-and-result crimes might lead quickly to Draconian results.
The potential distortions of a but for approach, however, may not be
readily apparent in the typical cause-and-result case. There, the applica
tion of the term "cause" is so intuitive that causal attribution is not seri
ously at issue. A person points a loaded gun at the chest of another
person and pulls the trigger. The bullet passes through the victim's
heart, destroying arterial and muscle tissue and stopping the blood flow
to the victim's vital organs, thus killing the victim. In attributing causal
responsibility to the shooter, most people would agree that she caused
hard gaze of the Legal Realists more than a half century ago. See Horwitz, The Doctrine ofObjective
Causation. in THE POLmcs OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRmQUE 201 (D. Kairys ed. 1982). The
classic treatment, of course, is Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928):
"What we ... mean by the word 'proximate' is, that because of convenience, of public policy, of a
rough sense ofjustice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain point.
This is not logic. It is practical politics." ld. at 402, 162 N.E. at 103 (Andrews, J., dissenting)
61. This is the "theory of condition," given sophisticated treatment by turn of the century
German theorists. See sources discussed in Ryu, supra note 51, at 787-88. German courts, however,
never applied the theory in its classic formulation. ld. In the United States, at least two
jurisdictions, Alabama and Texas, have included a causation provision in their criminal codes
providing for nothing more than "but for" causation, if read literally. This requirement, adopted in
virtually identical form by both states, provides: "A person is criminally liable if the result would
not have occurred but for his conduct, operating either alone or concurrently with another cause,
unless the Concurrent cause was sufficient to produce the result and the conduct of the actor clearly
insufficient." ALA. CoDE § 13A-2-5 (1982); see also TEx. PEN. CoDE ANN. § 6.04 (Vernon 1974).
Nevertheless, the respective commentary accompanying both provisions, as well as the decisions
interpreting and applying them, make it plain that neither state intended to, or did, abrogate
proximate cause analysis. See ALA. CoDE § 13A-2-5 commentary at 29-30 (1982); Searcy, Forward.
TEX. PEN. CoDE ANN. at xxiii (Verno1l 1974); see also Lewis v. State, 474 So. 2d 766, 770-71 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1985) (decedent's playing Russian Roulette by himself was a "supervening, intervening
cause sufficient to break the chain of causation," thus relieving defendant-who tanght decedent the
game-of negligent homicide liability); Westbrook v. State, 697 S.W.2d 791, 793 (Tex. Ct. App.
1985) (given the absence of legislative guidance concerning what "clearly sufficient" and "clearly
insufficient" mean in replacing the traditional proximate cause reqnirement, causation should simply
be left to the jury); Barnette v. State, 709 S.W.2d 650,651-52 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (discussing a
theory of "alternative cause" which would, in circumstances not well articulated, relieve a but for
causer of causal responsibility).
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the victim's death by pulling the trigger, even though that act was one of
many necessary conditions but for which the victim would not have
died.62
There plainly are cases, however, in which we would not say that
the shooter caused the victim's death, even though the shooting was a
but for cause of that death. For example, assume that the shooter, fully
intending to kill, shot at the victim but missed. To escape further assault,
the intended victim fled in an airplane which then crashed, killing him.
To be sure, by engaging in a voluntary act-squeezing the trigger of the
gun-with intent to kill the victim, the shooter is guilty of attempted
murder or assault with intent to kill,63 but we would not think of her as
guilty of murder. 64 If, however, but for causation were sufficient to
establish the cause of a harm, we must conclude that the shooter's act of
firing the gun caused the victim's death, and thus that she is guilty of
murder.
The purpose of proximate cause analysis is to avoid such unfair
results. It seeks to align causation principles applied in cause-and-result
crimes with everyday commonsense concepts of causation, in short, to
draw a sensible and predictable line between cause and condition, even in
complex cases involving numerous necessary conditions. 6s For example,
62. Working backwards in time from the harmful result, there is almost a limitless number of
factors one could identify as necessary conditions to that result. In this example, conditions
necessary to the result, but plainly irrelevant to the legal attribution of causal responsibility, would
include both physical factors-such as the speed and mass of the bullet-and human conduct-such
as the manufacture and sale of the weapon. See J. HALL, supra note 4, at 250-51. But given the
concern of criminal law with human conduct, we are not primarily concerned here with physical
forces, except as they might be said to displace human causal responsibility. See Ryu, supra note 51,
at 783-84: cj infra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
63. See H.L.A. HART & T. HONORE, supra note 56, at 395: W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra
note I, at 282 (both sources noting the interrelationship between the doctrines of attempt and
causation as limits on harm-causing and harm-risking liability).
64. Commenting on a similar hypothetical (the intended victim flees in a train, only to die in a
train wreck), Professors Hart and Honore assert that "[i]n such an extreme case most people would
not only refuse to say that the man had caused [the victim's] death but would recoil at the prospect
of punishing him with the same severity as that reserved for murder." H.L.A. HART &, T. HONORE,
supra note 56, at 395: see also People v. Warner-Lambert Co., 51 N.Y.2d 295,307,414 N.E.2d 660,
666,434 N.Y.S.2d 159, 165 (1980) (citing as a paradigm of insufficient proximate cause the example
of a drunken robbery victim who, left in the snow to die of exposure, instead was killed by a landing
airplane or a hunter's stray bullet), cert. denied. 450 U.S. 1031 (1981); W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT,
supra note I, at 287.
65. As a simple but fundamental matter of fair warning, since causation is an element of a
crime, causation must be interpreted consonant with the common understanding of its meaning (at
least insofar as such a commonsense meaning exists). See McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27
(1931) (discussed infra note 105 nd accompanying text): see also H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE
CRIMINAL SANCTION 95-96 (1968). Some have argued, however, that the common sense usages of
cause are too iII-defined to provide adequate guidance to proximate cause analysis. See. e.g.. Ryu,
supra note 51, at 775, 786. Professors Hart and Honore respond to this criticism, observing:
Whatever difficulties attend the notion of causation, we do after all succeed in
communicating with each other satisfactorily over a great area of discourse where we use
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assume that a shooting victim is merely wounded instead of killed. Dur
ing routine treatment of the wounded victim's injury, however, a doctor
makes a mistake in surgery, the wound is exacerbated, and the victim
bleeds to death. In such a case, assuming that the victim normally would
have survived the shooting wound, the doctor's mistreatment and the act
of squeezing the trigger were both but for causes of the victim's death.
The hard question is: which one of these necessary conditions was the
cause of death?66 A proper answer to this question of causal attribution
requires understanding both the characteristics of commonsense notions
of causation and the degree to which the criminal law incorporates these
concepts in its causation analysis.

B.

The Common Sense Paradigm of Cause and Effect

The paradigm of causation applicable to cause-and-result crimes is
physical cause and effect-a force setting in motion an object previously
at rest. 67 For example, when a person strikes a billiard ball with a cue
stick, we think of that action as causing the effect of the ball's ensuing
this notion; we manage to agree in our judgments about particular cases of causation in a
very large number of cases . . . . We must not think of a common-sense notion as
necessarily a matter of mere impression, or so intuitive that it cannot be further elucidated,
at least in its application to standard cases, however vague a penumbra may surround it.
Common sense is not a matter of inexplicable or arbitrary assertions, and the causal
notions which it employs, though flexible and complex and subtly influenced by context,
can be shown to rest, at least in part, on statable principles. . .. The ordinary man has a
quite adequate mastery of various concepts within the field of their day-to-day use, but,
along with this practical mastery goes a need for the explicit statement and clarification of
the principles involved in the use of these concepts.
H.L.A. HART & T. HONORE, supra note 56, at 26.
To speak of common-sense usages of causal principles does not, of course, exclude consideration
of more developed or specialized approaches to causation, such as those of philosophy or science.
See Ryu, supra note 51, at 776 (summarizing significant examples of such sophisticated causal
views). Indeed, the common understanding of causal concepts necessarily incorporates the lay
appreciation of a variety of sophisticated perspectives, which together help to form and inform the
amalgam of our culture. See J. HALL, supra note 4, at 290.
66. The verb "cause," of course, has linguistic equivalents such as "kill" in which the concept
of causation is subsumed. Some have argued forcefully that criminal law should not punish
according to harm actually caused but rather on the basis of risk created. See G. WILLIAMS, supra
note 4, at 136; Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: A Critique ofEmphasis on the Results ofConduct
in the Criminal Law. 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1497, 1600-03 (1974). But see H.L.A. HART & T.
HONORE, supra note 56, at 395-96; Michael & Wechsler, A Rationale ofthe Law ofHomicide IL 37
COLUM. L. REv. 1261, 1294-98 (1937); Ryu, supra note 51, at 796-99 (all justifying more severe
treatment of a defendant whose acts resulted in more serious harms). This issue is beyond the scope
of this Article. It is enough to note here that whatever its legitimacy, virtually every system of
criminal law to some extent punishes on the basis of actual results. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05
comment (Official Draft 1985) (summarizing the grading of attempts in American jurisdictions).
67. See J. HALL, supra note 4, at 253; H.L.A. HART & T. HONORE, supra note 56, at 27-32. It
is instructive, although surely not dispositive, that dictionary definitions of cause reflect this physical
cause and effect notion. The Oxford English Dictionary gives as its first general definition of cause,
"[t]hat which produces an effect; that which gives rise to any action, phenomenon, or condition.
Cause and effect are correlative terms." 2 OXFORD ENGLISH DICfIONARY 195 (1933) (italics in
original).
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movement. If that ball hits another ball and the second ball moves, we
similarly attribute this second ball's movement to the same causal force.
This causal attribution comes easily, though we recognize that a number
of other conditions, such as the weight, shape, and mass of the balls, are
also necessary conditions to the total effect we see. These conditions do
not alter our perspective because they are simply part of the normal or
"at rest" setting in which the striking and subsequent movement of the
balls occurred.
When simple physical systems interact, we can describe cause and
effect with relative certainty. It is more difficult to apply this cause and
effect paradigm directly to complex human interactions. To determine
whether a harm ought to be causally attributed to particular human con
duct, we generally analogize to the physical cause-and-effect paradigm. 68
This process of analogy involves a careful search for the impetus that
changed the "at rest" conditions. In the drowning child hypothetical, for
example, the physical push against the child is said to cause her fall into
the pool and thus her subsequent death. The child's wandering in the
pool's vicinity and the builder's building of the pool also caused her
death, but, though both are necessary conditions but for which the
drowning would not have occurred, they are not seen as causes of the
child's death. The common sense difference between the two is that the
push alters the status quo, analogous to striking the cue ball, while the
existence of the pool and the child's proximity to it represent thc "at
rest" state of affairs, analogous to the weight, shape, and mass of the
balls. In other words, when we ask what event caused an apparent
result, we seek to identify the act that disturbed the previous "at rest"
conditions-the normal state of affairs-so as to produce that result. 69
Common sense judgments about causation depend on how we define
"normal" and what we view as intrusive. Plainly these judgments are
relative and vary with the scope of the causal inquiry-the time frame of
the inquiry and the circumstances considered. For example, if we knew
more about the circumstances surrounding the child's drowning, we
might not regard either the existence of the pool or the child's wandering
nearby as the normal or "at rest" state of affairs. Instead, we might con
clude that either of these factors was a "cause" and not merely a condi
tion of her drowning. 7o Moreover, the characterization of particular
68. See H.L.A. HART & T. HONORE, supra note 56, at 27-28, 33.
69. Id. at 29-32.
70. For instance, assume that A. the person who pushed the child, is a deranged and
unpredictably violent man who has been committed to a mental hospital. B. the father, knows A and
his history. On this day, B and his young child are visiting A at the hospital where there is the pool.
If B leaves the child playing beside the pool, telling A to watch after her while he runs a few errands
off the hospital grounds, the child's wandering at pool's edge is hardly normal or part of the ordinary
background of events. Rather, it is a departure from normality that links the child's death to the
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circumstances and conduct as normal and thus "at rest," or abnormal
and thus intrusive, is anything but absolute. The distinction between
normal and abnormal implicates estimates of probability71-how likely it
is that a particular condition will in such circumstances occur-and rela
tive value judgments, including considerations of blame.72
Let us reexamine, in light of this causation analysis, the case of the
wounded shooting victim who died as a result of improper medical treat
ment. To assess whether the shooter is causally responsible for the
death, we must decide whether the events occurring after the shooting
were more like normality, and thus fairly chargeable to the shooter, or
more like a subsequent intrusive force, disturbing the victim's normal
recovery. In short, we ask whether it was sufficiently likely that malprac
tice would have occurred after the shot. 73 What is "sufficiently" likely is
in tum a function of: (1) the probability that malpractice would occur in
these circumstances; and (2) the relative value judgment about
whether-in light of the shooting and the nature of the subsequent mal
practice-such malpractice more resembles normality or abnormality.74
father's earlier conduct. See, e.g., Palmer v. State, 223 Md. 341, 351-53, 164A.2d 467, 473-74 (1960)
(holding that a mother's failure to remove a child from her home wherc the child was subjected to
severe beatings by the mother'S boyfriend was a proximate cause of the child's resulting death).
Further, assume that the operators of the hospital, knowing that the grounds would be utilized
for unsupervised visiting between psychotic individuals and their loved ones, including children,
constructed the pool in an easily accessible area without any protective barriers. This conduct,
permitting an obvious hazard to exist in the presence of small children and unpredictable mental
patients, might be seen as the cause of the child's death, although admittedly this seems more far
fetched. Cf. Regina v. Benge [1865] 4 F. & F. 504, 509-10, 176 Eng. Rep. 665, 667-68 (routine
maintenance of railroad track held, in homicide ease, to be the cause of a train wreck and ensuing
deaths when, due to the mistake of defendant foreman, work was in progress when train arrived).
71. See Wechsler & Michael, A Rationale ofthe Law ofHomicide 1. 37 CoLUM. L. REv. 701,
724 (1937) ("Indeed, it may in general be ventured that the only firm thread on which the causality
cases can be strung is that of probability."). Courts routinely utilize some variant of probability in
proximate cause analysis. See, e.g., Parsons v. State, 21 Ala. 300, 302 (1852) (natural consequences);
In re J.N., 406 A.2d 1275, 1282 (D.C. 1979) (whether physician's treatment of victim was a normal
or abnormal medical response); People v. Flenon, 42 Mich. App. 457, 461-62, 202 N.W.2d 471,474
(1972) (foreseeability); People v. Kibbe, 35 N.Y.2d 407, 412-13, 321 N.E.2d 773, 776, 362 N.Y.S.2d
848, &51-52, (1974) (probability, foreseeability of death).
72. See, e.g., J. HALL, supra note 4, at 288-89; Mueller, supra note 55, at 181-83. Professors
Hart and Honore, however, insist that considerations of moral judgment or responsibility have no
place in commonsense causal judgments. See H.L.A. HART & T. HONORE, supra note 56, at 65-68,
403-05. Yet, the sort of commousense empiricism that informs causal attribution can, and does,
include sueh concepts as moral responsibility and retributive justice as distinct from legal CUlpability.
73. Compare Baylor v. United States, 407 A.2d 664, 668-69 (D.C. 1979) with People v.
Stewart, 40 N.Y.2d 692, 698-99, 358 N.E.2d 487, 491-92, 389 N.Y.S.2d 804, 808-09 (1976); see also
infra note 80. Of course, the conclusion that the shooter is not causally responsible for the victim's
death does not mean that he or she will be fully exonerated. Assuming the requisite intent, he or she
may still be guilty of attempted murder or some other inchoate crime. See supra note 63 and
accompanying text.
74. The level of certainty sufficieut to establish the causal link is an issue properly left to the
jury. This allows the factfinder the latitude to decide, after lOOking at all of the facts in each
particular case, what couduct is normal or status quo and what is abnormal.or intrusive. Thus,
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Having observed that a common sense approach to causation is not
categorical, we should take care not to overstate its difficulties. 7s Society
seems able, after all, to find broad areas of agreement i~ ?€ veryday causal
judgments, both simple and complex. 76 Moreover, despite proximate
cause doctrines using such apparently objective termin~~ogy as "super
vening causes," "concurrent conditions," and "chains of causation,""
courts have tended, by and large, to use a commonsense approach.78 For
example, in our hypothetical case of a nonmortal gunshot wound made
fatal by improper medical treatment, many courts would treat the ques
tion of whether the shooter caused the victim's death as an issue of inter
vening cause. If the physician's malpractice is determined to be merely
negligent, then it would probably be deemed a mere "concurrent condi
tion," not an intervening cause sufficient to interrupt the chain of causa
tion between the defendant's shot and the victim's death. 79 If, on the
other hand, the doctor's malpractice was seen as grossly negligent or
when deciding that the shooter who tried to kill the victim is causally responsible for the victim's
death, characterizing even serious medical malpractice as more normal than abnormal does not
necessarily offend common sense. See infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
75. There are, of course, critics of the commonsense approach to causal attribution. Some
commentators, for example, suggest that the entire causation inquiry is little more than a mask for
covert policy judgments concerning the imposition of liability. See, e.g., L. GREEN, RATIONALE OP
PROXIMATE CAUSE 4-5, 39-43 (1927); Cohen, Field Theory and Judicial Logic, 59 YALE L.J. 238,
252-53, 259 (1950); Horwitz, supra note 60, at 211. Moreover, even among commentators who
continue to believe that legal causation has a meaningful role to play in criminal law theory, there is
disagreement with the commonsense approach.
Some, including Professors Hall and Ryu, take a teleological approach, arguing that the
assessment of causal responsibility for criminal harms must primarily be accomplished by reference
to the actor's culpability. While their specific proposals vary somewhat, they agree that causal
determinations must involve some aspect of culpability, given the dual blame/deterrence orientation
of criminal law. Thus, they view the causal assessment as imputing criminality to particular
conduct. See J. HALL, supra note 4, at 254-84; Ryu, supra note 51, at 783-86, 796.
Proponents of the teleological approach, however, do not suggest that causation analysis should
merge with the question of mens rea. Professor Hall advocates retaining the distinction between
causation and mens rea, and concedes that there are commonsense conceptions of causation that are
rellected in "legal causation." See J. HALL, supra note 4, at 249-54. Nevertheless, he argues that
such commonsense notions must be modified and guided by rules of liability which, though
assertedly not identical to the mens rea judgment, rellect penal policy. Id. at 249-51, 283-84. But he
'is never very clear about what those guiding rnles of liability are, and in the end, despite his
assertions to the contrary, HaIl's concept of causation merges into the general culpability inquiry.
Id. at 250-51, 283-84. Others have reached similar conclusions about Hal!. See, e.g., Mueller, supra
note 55, at 184-85; cf W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note I, at 209 and n.50.
76. See supra note 65 and accompanying text; see also J. HALL, supra note 4, at 288 (noting
that in everyday life we easily draw the distinctions between causes and conditions).
77. See supra note 58 and aceompanying text. Professors LaFave and Scott provide a concise
summary of the basic common law proximate cause doctrines. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note
I, at 287-94.
78. See H.L.A. HART & T. HONORE, supra note 56, at 130-32.
79. See, e.g., People v. CaIvaresi, 188 Colo. 277, 283, 534 P.2d 316,319 (1975), superseded by
statute as reported in People v. Bettis, 43 Colo. App. 104, 106, 602 P.2d 877, 878 (1979); Wright v.
State, 374 A.2d 824, 828-29 (Del. 1977).
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intentional, a court might well characterize it as a "supervening" or
"independent intervening" cause, thus relieving the shooter of causal
responsibility for the death. 80
The doctrinal distinction between simple negligent medical treat
ment and gross or intentional malpractice fits the commonsense analysis
discussed above. 81 Simple negligence, although hopefully unusual, is suf
ficiently ordinary that we more properly classify it as part of the normal
background rather than an intrusion, at least in the context of the shoot
ing. We usually come to the opposite conclusion for intentional or
grossly negligent malpractice. Although certainly a rough and value
laden judgment, intentional or grossly negligent malpractice seems suffi
ciently extraordinary, both in a probabilistic and a normative sense,82 to
be classified as an intrusion into the status quO. 83
80. See, e.g., People v. Stewart, 40 N.Y.2d 692, 696-99, 358 N.E.2d 487,491-92,389 N.Y.S.2d
804, 807-08 (1976) (physician's performance of unrelated surgical procedure during surgery to repair
stab wound constituted "grave neglect, possibly gross negligence," which was a "direct" cause of
death, thus relieving defendant of causal responsibility); see also Baylor v. United States, 407 A.2d
664,669-70 (D.C. 1979) (stating as dictum: "gross maltreatment of the wound, which was the sole
cause of death, is available as a defense to a charge of homicide, because the wound was not the
prOldmate cause of death") (emphasis and citation omitted); People v. Flenon, 42 Mich. App. 457,
461-62, 202 N.W.2d 471, 474-75 (1972) (grossly negligent treatment of a nonmortal wound that
leads to death relieves the assailant of causal responsibility, but this rule is inapplicable to the facts of
the case).
This sample of opinions demonstrates that courts are not wont to relieve a person of
responsibility for death that results from his or her infliction of an ultimately fatal wound even when
intervening medical malpractice is involved. Only in cases like Stewart, in which the malpractice
appears to have occurred in a medical procedure unrelated to the injury inflicted by defendant, are
courts willing as a matter of law to relieve the defendant of causal responsibility. In the usual case
where treatment of the injury somehow goes awry, malpractice will not suffice to negate prOldmate
cause. Thus in Bay/or, the government's pathologist testified that if the victim, who had been struck
in the side by a blunt object, had not been left waiting in the emergency room for two hours without
attention, she probably would have recovered from her spleen injury instead of dying two weeks later
of eomplications. Yet, the court held that even this blatant malpractice did not relieve the attacker,
of causal responsibility for the victim's subsequent death. Bay/or, 407 A.2d at 670.
81. By suggesting that various doctrinal strands of proximate cause can be reconciled with
sensible criminal causation analysis, I do not presume to defend all proximate cause rules, either in
the abstract or in particular application.
82. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
83. Unfortunately, the doctrinal reliance on "objective" terminology in assessing proximate
cause may well obscure this commonsense analogical process of causal attribution. Faced with this
problem, the drafters of the Model Penal Code turned away from "the encrusted precedents on
prol>imate causation" MODEL PENAL CoDE § 2.03 comment 135 (4th Tent. Draft 1955), and cast
the issue of causal attribution in terms that require the jury to decide on an almost intuitive basis.
Professor Mueller suggests that this is the way juries decide causation issues anyway, regardless of
how they are instructed. Mueller, supra note 55, at 173; see also Williams, supra note 24, at 430
(suggesting that causation judgments by a factfinder are of necessity at least in part intuitive). The
Code provides that when conduct is a "but for" cause of a result that occurred in a way other than
intended or risked, that conduct is treated as the cause of the result only if the result is the same kind
of harm intended or risked and the harm "is not too remote or accidental in its occurrence to have a
[just] bearing on the actor's liability or on the gravity of his offense." MODEL PENAL CoDE §§
2.03(2)(b), (3)(b) (proposed Official Draft 1962) (brackets in original).
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To summarize, the purpose of proximate cause analysis is to ensure
that causal judgments, even in complex cases, reflect commonsense
notions of cause and effect. To achieve this objective, the law necessarily
relies on probabilistic and normative judgments84 to bridge the gap
between the physical paradigm and nonphysical causal patterns in
human conduct. These assessments of causal responsibility often appear
awkward and imprecise, but as long as criminal law punishes the causa
tion of harm, they are unavoidable.

C.

Proximate Cause and Omissions

As noted, it seems at first inappropriate to apply commonsense cau
sation analysis to an individual's failure to engage in particular conduct.
If one focuses solely on the circumstances of an omission at the time
directly preceding the harm, the omission often appears not to have
affected the at rest state of affairs. For example, a person sitting in the
park while a nearby flower dies from lack of water is usually not consid
ered to have caused the plant's demise, even if a full watercan sits
nearby.8s If watering the plant would prevent its death, the failure to
water is a necessary condition of death. The plant's status quo, however,
is lack of water, and the person-by sitting-simply lets nature take its
course. Having apparently done nothing to disturb the status quo, he
could not have "caused" the death.
The difficulty in conceptualizing an omission as a causal force is that
omissions do not seem to fit within the parameters of the physical cause
and effect model. In the physical paradigm, there is a direct and identifi
able chain of events through which the actor can readily be seen as inter
vening and changing what existed before. In cases of omission, however,
the actor does not physically alter the status quo, but rather appears sim
ply to permit the preexisting state of affairs to continue. 86 Without direct
physical involvement in the causal process leading to a particular result,
an omitter seems no more causally responsible for the result than anyone
else. So in the drowning child example, the bystanders appear indistin
guishable from all persons who did not act to save the child,87 while the
84. See supra notes 71~72 and accompanying text.
85. Professors Hart and Honore use this example to illustrate what they see as "[t]he most
respectable objection to treating omissions as causes." H.L.A. HART & T. HONORt, supra note 56,
at 38.
86. See supra note 51.
87. This overstates the universality of apparent causal responsibility for failing to act. As
Professor John Kleinig observes, failures to prevent a harm should not be equated with all
"nonacts," a "nonact" being defined as the failure of each person in the universe to act to prevent
that harm. Omissions consist of that relatively narrow class of nonacts that have some connection to
the harm, a coIIl1ection that is missing for all other conduct that did not prevcnt the harm. See
Kleinig, supra note 4, at 169. In the example of the drowning child, saying that A. B. C. and D.
standing as they were around the pool, omitted to save her makes sense, while saying that someone
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one who pushed her is said to have caused the girl's death.
Such a view of causation is flawed because its inquiry is too limited.
It depends on a definition of the status quo as the existing physical state
of affairs at the precise time of the omission, much as if we took a picture
of the scene at the moment before the omission and then compared it to a
similar picture taken immediately thereafter, searching for a change in
circumstances physically attributable to the omissive conduct. 88 Our
everyday notions of causation, however, are not so limited because we
understand that the status quo encompasses more than the physical state
of affairs at a given time. 89 Indeed, in everyday usage the status quo is
taken to include expected patterns of conduct, including actions designed
to avert certain unwanted results. When, for example, a driver parks a
car on a steep hill, it is normal to set the parking brake and put the car in
gear. If the driver forgets to do so and the car subsequently rolls down
the hill, smashing into another car, we would say that the failure to park
properly was a departure from the status quo. This failure, not the visi
bly steep hill or the predicate act of pulling the car to the curb, was the
cause of the collision.
Once we realize that a particular undesirable state of affairs can be
avoided by taking certain precautions, we usually incorporate these pre
cautions into what we see as the normal or at rest state of affairs. A
failure to engage in the preventive conduct in these cases can thus be seen
as an intervention that disturbs the status quo. 90 When such a failure to
act is a necessary condition (a ''but for" cause) of a particular harm, then
that failure fairly can be said to cause that harm. In the above example,
the driver's failure to park the car in a proper manner caused the acci
dent as surely as if he had actually driven his car into the other.
At this level of analysis, omissions are rightly viewed as fitting the
classic cause-and-effect model, but this analysis still does not differentiate
among various persons who should engage in preventive conduct. To say
that the status quo includes all preventive conduct simply makes the
causal responsibility of omitters universal among those who reasonably
could have prevented the harm. Under this view of causation, a passen
without such knowledge and ability omitted to save her does not. Failures to engage in particular
conduct thus, in Kleinig's words, have "an attribution element," arising from a knowledge of and
ability to avert the harm, that is not shared by all other omissive conduct. ld. The universe of
"omitters" so qualified is thus limited to those who have relevant knowledge and ability, though not
necessarily those standing within sight of the child. See, e.g., the hypothetical discussed supra note
70.
88. This articulates the discredited concept of negative causation. See H.L.A. HART & T.
HONORE, supra note 56, at 30 & nn.3-4, and sources cited therein.
89. See J. HALL, supra note 4, at 195-97; H.L.A. HART & T. HONORE, supra note 56, at 30-31;
Hughes, supra note 4, at 627; Ryu, supra note 51, at 779.
90. See J. HALL, supra note 4, at 626; H.L.A. HART & T. HONORE, supra note 56, at 36.
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ger in the car would have caused the accident since she could easily have
set the emergency brake or instructed the driver to do so.
At first blush, it may seem attractive to apply an undifferentiated
causal responsibility to those able to prevent serious harms, leaving the
doctrines of mens rea and actus reus to determine criminal responsibil
ity.91 For example, in the drowning child hypothetical, there is nothing
terribly troubling about holding anyone who reasonably could have
saved the child but did not try causally responsible for the ensuing death.
But viewing causation questions from this perspective misses the issue.
The causal question for determining criminal responsibility should not be
answered on the basis of moral indignation but should instead be sharply
focused on whether we can fairly say that the respective omission of each
bystander "proximately caused" the child's death. It may be that society
is ready to assign causal responsibility to each, but as we have seen, it
would be unacceptable to base this decision on no more than but for
causation. 92 A failure to act to prevent a harm is not in every case a
departure from normality or a disturbance of the status quo. Returning
to the example of the wilting flower in the park, society is not ready to
attribute causal responsibility for the flower's death to the omitting
bystander. It simply is not the ordinary routine, the status quo, for every
person to engage in conduct that will prevent identifiable harms, even if
the preventive conduct involves no appreciable risk or expenditure of
resources by the potential actor. 93 Thus we do not categorize every fail
ure to act as the cause of an ensuing harm.
Nevertheless, we do expect certain persons to engage in particular
types of preventive conduct as a matter of routine. Because of this expec
tation, we perceive any failure of those persons to take prescribed actions
as a departure from normality. While we do not see the bystander's fail
ure to water the flower as the cause of its withering away, we take a
different view of such a failure by the park's gardener. We expect that
the gardener will take reasonable steps to prevent the flower's demise,
that is, his preventive conduct represents normality. A departure from
that status quo-his failure to water-is thus more than a necessary con
dition of the flower's death: it causes that result every bit as much as the
act of an intruder pulling the plant from its soil. 94
Of course, society's expectation of particular preventive conduct
91. As noted above, this was Bentham's position, as well as that of his American disciple,
Edward Livingston. See supra note IS. That sentiment is still echoed today. See, e.g., Glazebrook,
supra note 4, at 411; Hughes, supra note 4, at 626, 628.
92. See supra notes 64-63 and accompanying text.
93. For a suggestion as to why this is so, see infra note 100 and accompanying text.
94. See H.L.A. HART & T. HONORE, supra note 56, at 38; see also J. HALL, supra note 4, at
195-96 (characterizing the omission as "wrongly allowing the forees of physical causation to
operate" when one has a duty to act); cf. G. FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 606, 611 (characterizing the
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could be described as merely another formulation of "duty." The causa
tion analysis described here, however, differs from the conventional
approach since a person's "duty" in a particular context-how one is
expected to respond to the threat of a specific harm-is not determined
solely by looking to external legal doctrines. Rather, the duty is a func
tion of how society defines the status quo for that situation at that point
in time, a detennination based both on probabilistic and nonnative fac
tors. A "duty" sufficient to support criminal sanctions must be founded
on both an empirically valid expectation that persons in similar ~ircum
stances will act to prevent a harm-the probability aspect of nonnality
and also a deeply ingrained common understanding that society relies on
that individual to prevent the harm-the nonnative aspect of nonnality.
Thus parents have a "duty" to prevent harm to their children because
empirically, almost all parents act this way, and normatively, our society
would consider it reprehensible if they did not. 95 It is this combination
of deviance-departing from a pattern of regular perfonnance-and rep
rehensibility-being blameworthy-that makes us conclude that failure
to act caused the harm. 96 The preceding fonnulation does not, by any
duty requirement in criminal omissions as a "surrogate" for proximate cause, but not viewing duty
as a conceptual part of causation analysis).
95. See H.L.A. HART & T. HONORE, supra note 56, at 38.
96. The words "reprehensible" and "censure" do not necessarily have moral content. They
merely indicate that society attributes to the omission a connection to the harm which, assuming the
requisite mens rea and actus reus, will give rise to society'S censure for violating its law against
causing that harm. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 23. Ofcourse, to the extent that the common view
of causation is colored by notious of moral responsibility and retribution, then "reprehensible" and
"censure" as used here similarly take on that color. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
In apparent contrast to the causation perspective suggested here, the more conventional view of
omissions generally sees the source of the duty not as a function of causation but purely as a question
of policy. See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 4, at 390; Glazebrook, supra note 4, at 411; Kirchheimer,
supra note 4, at 629-30. Professor Hughes states the view succinctly:
This classification [of recognized legal duties] is probably neither exhaustive nor
exclusive, but it does indicate the sphere in which most present offenses of omission are
found and the policy which underlies their creation. To state that policy briefly, in the
immense complexity and interdependency of modern life, those who elect to pursue certain
activities or callings must, for the welfare of their fellow citizens, submit to a host of
regulations, some of which will naturally and properly impose positive duties to act.
Hughes, supra note 4, at 600. Hughes recognizes that this policy is at best amorphous, and that, at
least in the decisional law, no discernible principle for defining enforceable duties has emerged. He
suggests, following Bentham, that the sensible policy line would be to make criminal any failure to
save a life where the victim's peril is clear to the actor and the required preventive conduct involves
little or no risk to the actor. ld. at 631-34 & n.158, see also Glazebrook, supra note 4, at 411 ("A
legal system might impose liability wherever a reasonable person would and could have come to the
aid of another, and the criminal intent was present."). Professor Frankel, on the other hand, sees
value in an externally recognized legal duty as a basis for criminal liability, because the actor's
violation of a formally recognized obligation to act eases the ascription of culpability for omissions.
In apparent recognition of the conceptual rigidity of that approach, however, he would include as
enforceable duties "strong moral Obligations to act." Frankel, supra note 4, at 390. Professor
Kirchheimer, although he does not make the conceptual link to causation, probably comes closest to
the position suggested here. He argues that enforcing duties beyond those based on recognized and
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means, intend completely to disconnect the cause-related notion of duty
from externally cognizable legal duties. The very fact that a body oflaw,
for example contract law, has formalized and thus made obligatory a
particular standard of conduct suggests a regularity of performance. But
since regUlarity of performance does not alone constitute "normality," as
that term is here used, not all legal duties necessarily provide a basis for
criminal omission liability.97 Moreover, the above causal analysis con
ceptually does not require that a duty or expectation of conduct be a
formal legal duty. A particular failure to act might so deviate from the
status quo that we fairly can say that it caused an ensuing harm, even
though we are unable to squeeze this criminally enforceable expectation
of action, this duty, into a tort or contract theory.98
Once the concept of duty is recognized as a function of causation,
the determination of which failures to act bear causal responsibility flows
naturally from the criminal proscription. 99 Only those individuals whose
failure to act is inconsistent with the common expectation that they will
accepted relationships must ultimately reflect what he calls "living convictions put into practice by
smaller and more intimate communities." Kirchheimer, supra note 4, at 630. Only when communal
"value structures" underlie the requirement that particular persons must engage in preventive con
duct will criminal enforcement of such duties be valid. Id.
Kirchheimer seems correct. Although many people believe that it is unthinkable for someone
not to try to save another's life when it involves no risk to the saver, until that view is so widely
accepted-until it so embeds itself in the value structures that inform the way we live, not just the
way we talk-that we frecly consider the failure to take such an action as the cause of the victim's
death, there is no basis for inferring a criminally enforceable duty to act. The legislature may cer
tainly do so prospectively, but the courts may not retrospectively.
97. The substantial overlap between causal expeetations of conduct and externally recognized
duties, see, e.g., Frankel, supra note 4, at 390, may have played a large part in leading us,
erroneously, I suggest, to equate the two. Professor Hart draws an apt distinction between laws that
command (generally speaking, criminal law) and laws that, in his words:
provide facilities more or less elaborate for individuals to create structures of rights and
duties for the conduct of life within the coercive framework of the law. . •• Such rules,
unlike the criminal law, are not factors designed to obstruct wishes and choices of an
antisocial sort. On the contrary, these rules provide facilities for the realization of wishes
and choices."
H.L.A. HART, supra note 23, at 60-61. Given this distinction between criminal law and other law,
obligations arising under noncriminal law should only assume a command function when their viola
tion is so abnormal-that is, deviant and reprehensible, see supra notes 95-96 and accompanying
text-that causal attribution is appropriate if a harmful consequence results.
98. For example, we might characterize a skier, who without notifying anyone leaves her
injured companion in a darkening icy ravine, as acting so beyond what is normal that her failure to
summon aid fairly "caused" her companion's death. Similarly, a healthy niece who permits her
invalid aunt to perish from gangrene without seeking available medical treatment seems causally
responsible for that death. See Regina v. Instan [1893] 1 Q.B.450, 1891-94 All E.R. 1213, discussed
supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text. Yet neither of these expectations of preventive action are
neeessarily enforceable in contract or tort.
99. See J. HALL, supra note 4, at 196-97. But see G. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 4 (stating the
traditional view that "[t]he law relating to omissions is not co-extensive with law relating to acts");
G. FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 585-606 (similarly arguing for distinguishing between acts and
omissions, characterizing liability for the former as "direct" and for the latter as "derivativc").
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prevent a particular harm can be said to cause that harm. Other omit
ters, however culpable from a moral standpoint, are merely observers,
not causers, of the harm.
The drowning child hypothetical is illustrative. Assume that the
three other individuals who do not save the child's life are B, the child's
parent; C, the child's baby-sitter; and D, a stranger who happened by as
the child fell into the water. B and C certainly are expected to protect
the child from harm. The failure of each to try to save the child thus
violates that expectation or duty, and we naturally perceive these omis
sions as causes of the child's death, without regard to whether that duty
is legal or not.
D's failure to try to save the child, on the other hand, is far more
problematic. While we may agree that even a bystander is morally obli
gated to try to save the child, most of us would probably not think of D
as having caused the child's death, at least in the sense that along with A,
B, and C he is a proper subject for homicide liability. The explanation
for this conclusion perhaps lies in the notions of individual freedom and
autonomy that pervade our society. These notions suggest an atomistic
approach to life where, absent a special relationship, each person is
responsible for his own welfare, and thus a person's decision to "mind his
own business," cannot be said to affect the welfare of others. 100
Of course, what society sees as "minding one's own business," and
thereby avoiding liability for another's harm, is plaiuly subject to change.
100. This tradition of individualism obviously informed Lord Macaulay's restrictive approach
to omission liability in his Indian Penal Code proposals of a century ago. "We must grant impunity
to the vast majority of those omissions which a benevolent morality would pronounce reprehensible,
and must content ourselves with punishing such omissions only when they are distinguished from
the rest by some circumstance which marks them out as peculiarly fit objects of penal legislation."
T. MACAULAY, supra note 12, at 160. Moreover, despite what are perhaps overly optimistic views
(at least from the moralist's perspective) to the contrary, cj Hughes, supra note 4, at 625-26 ("[A]
vit:;w of moral responsibility is surely outmoded which imposes liability on the father who does not
warn his child of the precipice before him, but not on a stranger who neglects to warn the child
...•"), this emphasis on the individual appears to persist through the present. See J. HALL, supra
note 4, at 210-11; Wechsler & Michael, supra note 71, at 725 & nn.l05-06.
The continued vibrance of individual autonomy and freedom to act, even in ways concededly
immoral, seems more than just an embarrassing relic of an outmoded laissez-faire tradition. See
Frankel, supra note 4, at 378-84. While capable of overextension, this emphasis on the individual
reflects an important counterbalance in our society to the often overpowering urge to prevent harm.
Suggesting that causal judgments should be more than a mere reflection of moral intuition,
Professors Hart and Honore stated:
Always to follow the private moral judgment here would be far too expensive for the law:
not only in the crude sense that it would entail a vast machinery of courts and officials, but
in the more important sense that it would inhibit or discourage too many other valuable
activities of society. To limit the types of harm which the law will recognize is not enough;
even if the types of harm are limited it would still be too much for any society to punish or
exact compensation from individuals whenever their connection with harm of such types
would justify moral censure.
H.L.A. HART & T. HONORE, supra note 56, at 66-67 (emphasis in original).
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There may have been a time, for example, when operating a manufactur
ing enterprise in a manner dangerous to one's employees was "one's own
business," beyond the reach of criminal law. 101 Today such manufactur
ers can usually be reached by criminal sanctions.102 Similarly, some day
it may be that D, the bystander, will not be able to stand by with impu
nity and watch the child drown. But the fact that shifting value judg
ments fonn the basis for punishing the causation of hann, does not
invalidate the application of criminal sanctions. The issue is not whether
we may ever base punishment on impennanent value judgments, but
whether at a given time a particular value is so well understood and
accepted as a basis for punishment that we may fairly impose criminal
liability on those who fail to act accordingly. Put in the context of crimi
nal omissions, the question becomes: will basing criminal liability on
commonsense notions of causation give fair warning that certain conduct
is criminal?

C.

The Fair Warning Question

The requirement of fair warning generally mandates: (1) that the
State identify conduct that it deems criminal prior to enforcement; and
(2) that criminal prohibitions be sufficiently clear that persons of com
101. As pointed out by Professor Frankel, 19th century prosecutions for deaths resulting from
industrial accidents looked to particular individuals, not the enterprise generalIy, in meting out
judgments of responsibility. The defendants typically were those employees with direct supervisory
responsibility over the aspect of the enterprise that went awry, not the owners of the operation. See
Frankel, supra note 4, at 381 & n.45. Frankel views this as a policy decision to limit the scope of the
law of manslaughter in order to protect the owners of such enterprises and encourage commercial
and industrial endeavors. Id; see also Horwitz, supra note 60, at 211 (noting that the abandonment
of the early doctrine of "objective causation" pennitted courts to assign causal responsibility based
on what they considered a fair distribution of risk).
Notwithstanding this policy argument, it seems plausible that the unwillingness to proceed
criminally against the owners was also a manifestation of the then-prevalent notion of causation.
Typically, the voluntary human act most temporally and physicalIy proximate to the ultimate hann
was conceptualized as superseding all prior causal forces. See. e.g.• 3 J.F. STEPHEN, supra note 3, at
8. This usually meant the act of the employee. Although 19th century theorists recognized that
policy ideals could limit the scope of homicide liability, id. (recognizing the rule that potential
homicide liability expires a year and a day after the act as such a policy limit), they emphasized that
"killing," within the homicide proscription, meant "causing death directly." Id. at 3.
102. See Comment, Corporations Can Kill Too: After Film Recovery. Are Individuals
Accountable/or Corporate Crimes? 19 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 1411 (1986) (colIecting eases of homicide
prosecutions of corporations and their officers for hanns resulting from negligent operations); see
also Note, The Application 0/ Criminal Homicide Statutes to Work-Related Deaths: Mens Rea and
Deterrence. 1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 969, 977-99 (arguing that application of homieide liability,
assuming the requisite mens rea. will deter employers from maintaining dangerous workplace
conditions). Nevertheless, examples of the old reticence remain, as exemplified by the New York
Court of Appeals opinion in People v. Warner-Lambert Co., 51 N.Y.2d 295, 303-04 & n.I, 414
N.E.2d 660, 664 & n.I, 434 N.Y.S.2d 159, 163 & n.1 (1980) (suggesting, but finding it unnecessary to
decide, that New York's manslaughter statute should not be construed to apply to manufacturing
operations), cerL denied. 450 U.S. 1031 (1981).
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mon understanding can know what conduct they must avoid. 103 The fair
warning requirement protects against unduly vague (and hence poten
tially distortable) criminal statutes and, simil~r1y, forbids courts from
applying facially clear criminal statutes to conduct not fairly within the
ambit of those statutes. 104 Professor Packer has called this statutory
construction aspect of fair warning "a junior version of the vagueness
doctrine." lOS
Criminal omission analysis raises the statutory construction aspect
of fair warning. When a court decides that a defendant omitter is crimi
nally liable for a particular harm, it is in effect applying the statutory
prohibition against causing that harm to a past omission. This necessar
ily retrospective identification of an omission as the cause of a harm
requires that the criteria by which causation is established-societal
expectations of preventive conduct-be sufficiently clear and predictable
to give fair warning.
Fair warning, of course, does not require absolute certainty. Indeed,
the law has long relied on imprecise value judgments when setting liabil
ity limits in manslaughter and negligent homicide cases.106 Assuming
causation is established, the laws proscribing these unintentional forms of
103. For cases discussing the fair warning requirement, see, for example, Kolender v. Lawson,
461 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1983); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733,774-75 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting);
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939); Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385,
393 (1926). As these cases indicate, the requirement of statutory clarity generally has been analyzed
under the vagueness doctrine.
104. See G. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 586. As Dr. Williams points out, fair warning
principles do not require that courts read criminal statutes as restrictively as possible, but only that
the terms be given a reasonably sensible coustruction consistent with their purposes. [d. at 588-89.
lOS. H. PACKER, supra note 65, at 95. In a well-known example, McBoyle v. United States, 283
U.S. 25 (1931), the Supreme Court reviewed a conviction for interstate transportation of a stolen
motor vehicle. The motor vehicle in question was an airplane, and defendant argued that the
statutory term "vehicle" did not fairly include an aircraft. Justice Holmes, writing for the Court,
agreed:
Although it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider the text of the law
before he murders or steals, it is reasouable that a fair warning should be given to the world
in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a
certain line is passed. To make the warning fair, so far as possible the line should be clear.
[d. at 27.
Some courts have held that a strict construction of criminal statutes is required not only to
satisfy fair warning, but also to avoid judicial encroachment on the legislative power to define crimes.
See, e.g., Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 619,631-33,470 P.2d 617, 624-26, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481,
488-90 (1970). This concern, however, is virtually irrelevant in the context of construing statutes
that are not uuacceptably vague on their faces. After all, the legislature in such cases has defined a
crime with a fair degree of precision-in McBoy/e, the interstate transportation of stolen motor
vehicles. If courts interpret the legislative proscription within the common understanding to include
a particular kind of conduct, the legislative mandate and the requirement of sufficient legislative
crime definition are satisfied. See G. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 586-90; see a/so H. PACKER, supra
note 65, at 94-95.
106. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *191-93; I E. EAST, supra note 3, at 262; I M.
HALE, supra note 3, at 472; see also Kirchheimer, supra note 4, at 638 ("there exists a boundary line
between civil and criminal negligence which has to be redetermined by each new jury"); cj Weschler
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homicide define criminal conduct solely on the basis of the actor's culpa
bility.107 The specific formulation of these culpability judgments may
vary, from the time-tested formulation of East-"whether common
social duty would, under the circumstances, have suggested a more cir
cumspect conduct"10S_to the more rigorous and formalistic assessment
of justification and risk incorporated in the Model Penal Code.109 In
each formulation, the distinction between lawful conduct and some form
of culpable homicide depends on how society balances the value of pro
tecting life with the value of promoting useful activity and individual
freedom of action. In the words of the commentators to the Code:
"There is no way to state this value judgment that does not beg the ques
tion in the last analysis; the point is that the jury must evaluate the
actor's conduct and determine whether it should be condemned.,,110
This kind of raw value judgment, as difficult as any particular one
might be to predict, has always provided an acceptably clear standard of
criminal liability. 111 So long as there is a common understanding within
society as to the bounds of particular criminal liability, the criteria of
that liability need not be perfectly precise in order to satisfy the require
ment of fair warning (at least where a more precise formulation is not
possible).112
As the preceding discussion suggests, principles of fairness are satis
fied by the relatively open-ended value balance that defines homicide lia
bility. By implication, then, the more narrowly focused value judgments
inherent in our analysis of omission liability should not offend fair-warn
& Michael, supra note 71, at 751 n.175 (noting the similarity between the vagueness that attends

punishing omissions and the vagueness in crimina1liability for negligence).
107. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CoDE § 192 (West Supp. 1988); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 125.1()...20
(McKinney 1987); 18 PA. CoNS. STAT. ANN. § 2504 (purdon 1983); WASH. REV. CoDE ANN.
§ 9A.16.030 (1987).
108. I E. EAST, supra note 3, at 262; see I M. HALE, supra note 3, at 471-77; see also O.W.
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 56-57 (1881) ("the test of murder is the degree of danger to life
attending the act under the known circumstances").
109. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.4 comment 3 (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1980),
§ 2.02 comments 3,4 (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1985). In determining culpability, the
Code explicitly requires assessment, from the actor's perspective, of the likelihood that his or her
conduct will cause another's death. The Code then requires the factfinder to determine whether,
given that risk of death, the actor was nevertheless justified in proceeding with the conduct in
question. See id. § 2.02(2)(c), (d) ("recklessly" and "negligently" defined). The jury thus must
decide whether the defendant created such a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death that, given the
nature and purpose of his or her conduct and the circumstances in which that conduct occurred, the
defendant's act was a gross deviatiou from law-abiding or reasonable conduct. Jd. For a summary
of statutory and common law approaches to defining manslaughter and negligent homicide, see id.
§§ 210.3-.4 comments I, 2 (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1980).
110. Jd. § 2.02 comment 3 (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1985).
111. See sources cited supra note 106.
112. See, e.g., United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. I, 7-8 (1947) (requiring "sufficiently definite
warning" measured by "common understanding and practices").
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ing principles. The value judgment called for in the omission inquiry is
relatively specific: whether or not, in particular circumstances, particu
lar persons are so commonly expected to take protective action that their
failure to do so makes them causally responsible for ensuing harms. In
order to satisfy the warning requirement, society's recognition of causal
responsibility must be so widespread that it is fair to charge the actor
with a post hoc awareness and appreciation of that expectation. Thus,
the fair warning requirement mandates that we draw a causal link
between certain omissions and proscribed harms only when this causa
tion judgment is one that the "common mind" accepts. 113
If courts adhere to the commonsense causation analysis developed
above, then by definition the fair-warning problem would disappear. At
anyone time, there is a sufficiently definite understanding in the commu
nity, the "common" understanding, concerning how people are expected
to act. When a person's conduct violates these community norms, he or
she is fairly on notice of that violation, and thus criminal judgments
based on these norms do not offend the principles of fair warning. 114
Commentators have objected that omissions cases inherently raise
unique problems of notice; at least one commentator has even argued
that omissions should never be punished absent actual knowledge of the
duty.115 These objections are miscast. Merely because an omitter does
113. See McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931); see also supra notes 104-05 and
accompanying test. Of course, to the extent that the expectation of preventive conduct has coalesced
into a formal duty under external law, notice is more easily imputed. See Frankel, supra note 4, at
397.
114. See Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913) (upholding against a vagueness challenge
the criminal provisions of the Sherman Act). In addressing the defendants' contention that
punishing "unreasonable" restraints on trade ran afoul of the fair warning requirement, Justice
Holmes, speaking for the Court in Nash, wrote:
[T]he law is full of instances where a man's fate depends on his estimating rightly, that is,
as the jury subsequently estimates it, some matter of degree. If his judgment is wrong, not
only may he incur a fine or a short imprisonment, as here; he may incur the penalty of
death. "An act causing death may be murder, manslaughter, or misadventure according to
the degree of danger attending it" by common experience in the circumstances known to
the actor. "The very meaning of the fiction of implied malice in such cases at common law
was, that a man might have to answer with his life for consequences which he neither
intended nor foresaw."
ld. at 377 (quoting Commonwealth v. Pierce, 138 Mass 165, 178 (1884».
"The criterion in such cases is to examine whether common social duty would, under the
circumstances, have suggested a more circumspect conduct." If a man should kiII another
by driving an automobile furiously into a crowd he might be convicted of murder however
little he expected the result. If he did no more than drive negligently through a street he
might get off with manslaughter or less. And in the last case he might be held although he
himself thought that he was acting as a prudent man should.
ld. (quoting I E. EAST, supra note 3, at 262) (citations omitted)}.
Of course, if the legislature itself creates a duty in particular circnmstances to save another
person, see, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (1973) (quoted in full supra note 12), the fair notice
problem almost certainly disappears. But see Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957) (municipal
ordinance violates fair warning requirement); see also infra note 117.
115. See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 4, at 601-02.
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not act affirmatively does not mean he lacks notice that his conduct is
criminal. For example, we would not say that the idle baby-sitter in the
drowning child hypothetical should escape prosecution merely because,
as a passive actor, he could have no idea that such conduct was criminal.
Rather, the problem of notice with respect to omissions derives from the
apparent distance of the omitter from harm in question. The omitter,
standing physically apart, does not seem to be doing anything connected
to the harm. But we characterize someone as a harm-causing omitter,
not because of the physical connection found in the traditional cause and
effect paradigm, but because of an expectation of preventive conduct by
that omitter wherever he or she physically may be. 116 When such an
expectation is widely recognized, a court's determination that the failure
to act caused the result raises no fair-warning problem.
The less widely accepted the expectation is, of course, the more
problematic notice becomes-the more unsure we are that it is fair to
hold the omitter causally responsible. 117 But this is no different from
affirmative acts. There plainly are limits to all causal attribution beyond
which, as a matter of law, a jury is not permitted to gO.118 In short, both
acts and omissions, if held criminal, are no more than patterns of con
116. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
117. Fair notice is always a potential problem when a criminal prohibition, even a clear one, is
applied to conduct not on its face plainly criminal. In Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957),
the Supreme Court invalidated as· violative of due process a Los Angeles ordinance requiring
convicted felons to register with the police within five days of entering the city. The defendant, who
was new to Los Angeles, knew nothing of the ordinance and failed to eomply. Justice Douglas,
writing for the Court, observed that, unlike most registration statutes or ordinances, violation of this
ordinance required only one's presence in the city, unaccompanied by any other activity. He
reasoned that since there was nothing about "mere presence" that in normal circumstances would
move someone to inquire as to such a statutory requirement, it was fundamentally unfair to punish
for its violation unless it was a knowing violation. ld. at 229-30. Although Douglas focused on the
defendant's lack of activity-a fact that Justice Frankfurter attacked, arguing that the Court was
creating a constitutional difference between misfeasance and nonfeasance, id. at 231 (Frankfurter, J.,
disserting}--the thrust of Douglas' point was not that the defendant was inactive during her stay in
Los Angeles, but that she had engaged in no conduct fairly connected with any need to check in with
the police. She was quintessentially "minding her own business," and the fact that the city's
ordinance book had two or three lines of type saying she should register with the police did not fairly
warn her of her duty.
Although Lambert was a constitutional decision-perhaps because there was no other basis on
which the Court could review-similar notice analysis has been utilized to decide whether regulatory
statutes require the defendant's knowledge of the regulation as an element of its violation. Compare
United States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 565 (1971) with Liparota v.
United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426-27, 430 (1985).
118. As developed above, proximate cause analysis sets these limits. See supra notes 57-58, 80
and accompanying text. To the extent that foreseeability of the harm operates as a limit on
causation, see supra note 71, the question of how far causal attribution should be extended seems
related to, if not explicitly, a problem of uotice. See o. W. HOLMES, supra note 108, at 55:
All foresight of the future, all choice with regard to any possible consequence of
action, depends on what is known at the moment of choosing. An act cannot be wrong,
even when done under circumstances in which it will be hurtful, unless those
circumstances are or ought to be known.
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duct to which criminal harms have been causally attributed. So long as
the common understanding of cause and effect is fairly reflected in such
attribution, the requirement of fair warning is satisfied as to either.

III
AN INTEGRATED ApPROACH TO OMISSIONS

As developed above, the proper way to analyze criminal omissions is
to examine whether the actor's conduct, given the circumstances in
which it occurred, can fairly be said to have caused the proscribed harm.
This formulation derives from the nature of the criminal proscription,
which punishes the causing of particular harms. The simplicity of this
analysis, however, has been obscured by the doctrinal insistence that
criminal law draw ultimately unhelpful distinctions between active and
"omissive" conduct. The act/omission distinction requires identifying a
duty to perform the omitted acts in order to forge an intelligible causal
link between the so-called omission and the criminal result. This duty in
tum must be of determinate origin to maintain predictability and thus
provide fair warning. As we have seen, the doctrinal response to the fair
warning issue has been that the duty must be a "legal duty," without a
great deal of attention to the meaning, if any, of that term.
The doctrinal analysis is at best unnecessary, for its conceptual
foundation-the notion that there is a distinction between acts and omis
sions-is inherently flawed. However labeled, the criminal law ulti
mately proscribes and punishes conduct. Conduct causally attributed to
a particular harm is characterized as an omission only because too little
of the actor's conduct has been analyzed. If the inquiry focuses solely on
the conduct that immediately precedes the harm, certainly that conduct
often will appear passive or omissive with respect to the harm. There is,
however, no sound reason to limit the notion of causality to conduct that
is temporally and physically proximate to the harm. 119
Even in conventional "acts," the last few actions of the actor do not
necessarily constitute the entire course of conduct relevant to the analysis
of causation. If the driver of an automobile suffered an epileptic seizure
and lost control of her vehicle, consequently striking and killing a pedes
trian, she might argue that, because she was unconscious at the moment
she hit the victim, she engaged in no voluntary act that caused the
harm. 120 If we focus our conduct inquiry exclusively on her driving at
119. The tendency, in assessing causal responsibility, to look only to the actor's last few actions
is probably attributable to the central role that the physical cause and effect paradigm plays in our
notions ofcausation. In this paradigm, it is typically the last few actions that cause the change in the
status quo. See. e.g., 3 J.F. STEPHEN, supra note 3, at 3 ("[k]illing may be defined as causing death
directly, distinctly, and not too remotely").
120. Such cases have arisen. See. e.g.• Tift v. State, 17 Ga. App. 663, 88 S.E. 41 (1916); State v.
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the time the pedestrian died, her claim appears tenable. In seeking to
determine' the cause of the pedestrian's death, however, the relevant
course of conduct is plainly the driver's entire operation of the vehicle,
not just her last few unconscious moments. From this broader perspec
tive, the fact that she began to drive, knowing of her epilepsy, is every bit
as much the cause of death as would be the actions of an alert but reck
less driver who misjudged his ability to negotiate a tum, thereby striking
and killing the pedestrian. 121 In this case, or any case, we simply cannot
properly evaluate the actor's causal responsibility without examining all
of the conduct relevant to the harm.
By analyzing cases in terms of omissions, traditional doctrine artifi
cially narrows the definition of conduct to that which immediately pre
cedes the harm. If instead we examine the entire course of conduct
relevant to a harm, we can avoid the confusion that often arises in "omis
sions" analysis. Take, for example, Barber 'Y. Superior Court,122 dis
cussed earlier in this Article. 123 Recall that in Barber the defendant
doctors had discontinued intravenous feeding and hydration, thereby
allowing their comatose patient to die. In applying conventional omis
sions analysis, the court focused solely on the last thing the doctors did,
that is, the removal of the patient's nutrition and hydration tubes, as the
relevant conduct. 124 The court then had to decide whether that conduct
was an "act" or an "omission." If it was an "act," the doctors would be
guilty of murder, for by that "act" they had intentionally killed their
patient without legal justification. 125 Only by characterizing the doctors'
conduct as an "omission" could the court avoid this automatic result and
become free to engage in a more contextual analysis of the doctors' homi
cide liability. Analogizing to the provision of" 'heroic' life support," the
court decided that the conduct was an omission. 126 This conclusion
required the court then to face the question of duty. The doctors were
certainly under a duty to treat their patient according to professional
standards of care, and this duty was "legal.,,127 The difficult issue for the
Gooze, 14 N.J. Super 277, 81 A.2d 811 (App. Div. 1951); People v. Decina, 2 N.Y.2d 133, 138
N.E.2d 799, 157 N.Y.S.2d 558 (1956).
121. The courts in Tift, Gooze, and Decina all attributed causal responsibility and decided the
cases along similar lines. See Tift, 17 Ga. App. at 664, 88 S.E. at 41; Gooze, 14 N.J. Super. at 285·87,
81 A.2d at 815·16; Decina, 2 N.Y.2d at 139-40, 138 N.E.2d at 803·04 157 N.Y.S. 2d at 564-66.
122. 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983).
123. See supra notes 5·9 and accompanying text.
124. Id. 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1012·16, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 487·90.
125. Id. at 1012, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 487.
126. Id. at 1016, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490. If it seems awkward to characterize the act of turning
off a switch or pulling out a tube as an "omission," that discomfort reflects the artificiality of the
omission approach to causal attribution. The doctor was plainly engaged in a course of conduct vis·
a·vis the patient, the last act of which was the removal of the tubes.
127. Id. at 1017, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
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court was whether the doctors' denial of nutrition and hydration to this
patient five days after he became comatose violated that "legal duty." To
decide that the doctors did not violate their duty to treat their patient
properly, and thus that they did not murder him, the court held: (1) that
providing nutrition and hydration to the patient constituted "medical
treatment;"128 (2) that the doctors' duty to provide medical treatment
did not encompass ineffective or futile treatment,129 and (3) that provi
sion of nutrition and hydration to this patient in these circumstances was
futile or ineffective.130
This traditional approach to determining criminal liability in Barber
is plainly flawed. By fragmenting causation analysis into separate ques
tions of "acts," "omissions," and "legal duty," the conventional
approach makes the doctors' homicide liability turn on such superficial
distinctions as whether pulling out a tube is an "act" or an "omission"
and whether intravenous feeding is a "medical procedure" (and thus
treatment) or a "typical human way [] of providing nutrition" (and thus
feeding, which the doctors as caretakers would have had a duty to per
form).131 If courts force the liability analysis into these discrete catego
ries, which are only tangentially connected to the underlying criminal
prohibition against causing harm, they risk allowing the analysis to stray
from its purpose-assessing the causal connection between the actor's
conduct and the particular harm. 132 Worse still, fragmenting the liability
issue permits a court, bent on a particular outcome, to truncate the rele
128. ld. at 1016-17, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490. The basis for this conclusion was that intravenous
feeding seems more like a medical proeedure than like "typical human ways of providing nutrition
and hydration." ld. This classification of feeding as treatment is, in one sense, the linchpin of the
decision. If the doctors failed to feed-as opposed to failed to treat-their patient, it is far more
difficult to hold that they as caretakers had not violated a "legal duty" to their patient. See, e.g.,
cases discussed supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
129. 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1017-18, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
130. ld. at 1018-22, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491-93.
131. ld. at 1016-17, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
132. The faIljoUS Beardsley case is an example of how a court's overly rigid dependence on the
external legal duty doctrine caused a skewed result. People v. Beardsley, 150 Mich. 206, 113 N.W.
1128 (1907); see also supra note 50. In Beardsley, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed a
manslaughter conviction for failure to seek medical aid for a weekend guest who had consumed too
much alcohol and drugs. The court held that the defendant was under no legal duty to render the
guest any assistance. In reaching this conclusion, the court examined the two external legal
doctrines that could give rise in such circumstances to a legal duty-husband/wife and assumption
of care of one who is helpless-and concluded that neither applied. ld. at 210-15,113 N.W. at 1130
31.
Strictly speaking, the Beardsley court may have been correct that defendant was not under any
civilly enforceable duty to render aid. But if we examine all of defendant's conduct with respect to
his guest over that weekend-inviting her to his home to consume a substantial amount of alcohol,
failing to summon medical assistance when she collapsed, and then shifting her to another apartment
to avoid detection-there is ample room to Conclude that his conduct cansed her death. It seems
absurd that a jury should be foreclosed as a matter oflaw from so deciding, but that is in effect what
the court held.
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vant time period in order to reach a result that would be far less defensi
ble if viewed from the overall perspective of the actor's causal liability for
a particular harm. 133 Courts can avoid such distortion if, without refer
ence to acts, omissions, or duties, they simply ask the broader question of
whether the actor caused-as that word is intended to be used in the
criminal statute-the particular proscribed harm.
In Barber, if we look only at the doctors' act of removing the intra
venous tubes, it is difficult to distinguish the doctors from a hypothetical
intruder who pulled out the tubes. The doctors and the intruder, how
ever, clearly are different; the doctors acted within a sophisticated treat
ment context. Thus, a proper assessment of the doctors' causal
responsibility must go beyond the simple act of removing the tubes and
focus on the full treatment rendered, including all of the circumstances in
which that treatment was sought and given, not just on the doctors' last
few actions.
The proper question in a case such as Barber is: was the patient's
death caused by his coma-inducing heart attack, thereby making the doc
tors' post-operative conduct (including the decision to stop feeding) caus
ally irrelevant to the patient's inevitable death? Or, alternatively, did the
doctors' act of discontinuing nutrition so alter the patient's status quo
that it caused his death?134 From the broader perspectives of ethics,
morals, or philosophy, these questions, as well as the underlying issue of
how to deal with permanently comatose persons, concededly are not
easy. Nevertheless, in the narrower context of applying California's
homicide prohibition, the answers seem less difficult. Since the patient in
Barber, even in his comatose state, was by California law alive and in no
imminent danger of death when the doctors cut off his nutrition and
hydration,135 it is difficult to avoid concluding that the doctors caused his
death. Given that euthanasia is not legally justified in California,136 such
intentional conduct seems unavoidably to constitute criminal
133. Arguably, this is exactly what the California Court of Appeal did in Barber. See discussion
supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
134. It is important to keep the causation issue separate from the issues of mens rea and
justification. If the doctors' conduct was not legally a cause of death, these latter issues arc
irrelevant. Only if the doctors' acts are seen as causally conneeted to the patient's death is it
necessary to examine the further issue of (1) whether through treatment the doctors negligently,
recklessly, or purposely caused the death, and if so (2) whether they were nevertheless justified in
that course of action.
135. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at lOB, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 488. At the time the patient died,
California by statute defined death as "a total and irreversible cessation of brain function." Act of
Sept. 27, 1974 ch. 1524, § I, 1982 Cal Stat. 3430, repealed by Act of Sept. 7, 1982, ch. 810, § I, 1982
Cal. Stat 3098, 3098. The current version defines death as "irreversible cessation of all functions of
the entire brain." CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CoDE § 7180 (West Supp. 1988). With minimal brain
function, the patient faced, in the words of the court, "an indefinite vegetative existence." Barber,
147 Cal. App. 3d at lOB, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
136. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1012, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 487.
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homicide. 137
If the result in Barber derived from our analysis appears unduly
harsh or unfair, that is not the fault of causal analysis. Indeed, it is only
through such a particnlarized and unified analysis of the doctors' behav
ior that we can be sure of fairly gauging the doctors' causal responsibility
for ending that comatose life. Rather, if we are troubled, our quarrel is
with the underlying legislative judgments that a permanently comatose
patient is "alive" within the meaning of the laws and that ending such a
life is criminally prohibited by those laws. Any modification of these
fundamental judgments ought to be made by the representative legisla
ture and not by a court under the cover of "legal duty" analysis.
The proposed approach to defining relevant criminal conduct
examining an actor's course of conduct rather than a single discrete act
is hardly novel. Courts have long used this analysis in negligent homi
cide or manslaughter cases. 138 Defendants in these cases seem charge
able with causing death either by failing to engage in preventive or
precautionary conduct or by acting recklessly or negligently. It is merely
a question of characterization; the underlying conduct is the same either
way.
For example, in Commonwealth v. Welansky,139 the owner/operator
of Boston's Cocoanut Grove night club was convicted of several counts
of manslaughter after nearly 500 persons perished in a fire in his club.
The conviction rested mainly on the owner's failure to provide adequate
fire escapes, considering the extremely crowded conditions in the club. 140
Most of the manslaughter counts were predicated on the theory that the
defendant recklessly disregarded his duty of care to his patrons. A few
counts, however, proceeded on an affirmative act theory that defendant
"assault[ed] and beat" certain victims (by inviting them onto the prem
ises and subjecting them to fire), thus killing them "by wilfully, wantonly
and recklessly maintaining, managing, operating and supervising the said
premises." 141 Defendant was convicted of counts based on both theories.
137. See CAL. PENAL CoDE § 187 (West Supp. 1988) ("[m)urder is the unlawful killing of a
human being ••• with malice aforethought"). Iu the face of this unambiguous statutory prohibition,
it is troubling for the court to claim lack of legislative guidance and then to create a judicial
exception to murder.
138. See, e.g., Pcople v. Long, 15 Cal. 2d 590, 103 P.2d 969 (rendering medical care), cert.
denied, 311 U.S. 698 (1940); State v. Gooze, 14 N.J. Super. 277, 81 A.2d 811 (1951) (operating an
automobile); People v. Clemente, 146 A.D. 109, 130 N.Y.S. 612 (1911) (couducting blasting
operations), aff'd, King v. Bissell, 207 N.Y. 602, 101 N.E. 1107 (1913); State v. Green, 38 Wash. 2d
240, 229 P.2d 318 (1951) (hunting); see also supra note 102 and accompanying text (noting the
possible addition of manufacturing operations to this list).
139. 316 Mass. 383, 55 N.E.2d 902 (1944).
140. ld. at 387-93, 55 N.E.2d at 905-07.
141. ld. at 395, 55 N.E.2d at 908. The prosecution also proceeded with respect to other counts
on a straight misdemeanor manslaughter theory, alleging simply that the defeudant assaulted and
beat particular victims and that the victims thus died. ld. The different approaches canuot be
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In reviewing defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the charges
and their supporting evidence, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court did not treat the "act" and "omission" counts separately. Instead,
the court analyzed the defendant's liability by examining the owner's
entire course of conduct with respect to the victims. Whether defend
ant's activities were characterized as a failure to engage in expected pre
ventive conduct, or as a series of affirmative acts in maintaining his
building, the defendant's causal responsibility for the deaths of his
patrons derived directly from his conduct with respect to the persons
who entered his club. The court thus upheld all of the convictions based
on the "wanton or reckless" way in which the building was maintained
and the club operated. 142
One may argue that the Welansky court's analysis is appropriate for
instances in which the actor has engaged in specific and identifiable
"affirmative" conduct, such as rendering medical treatment or operating
a nightclub. This would suggest that our analysis applies only to conduct
that in the end may not be truly omissive, but that all other "true" omis
sions should not be analyzed in these terms.143 An examination of other
kinds of omissions, however, demonstrates that they too are more prop
erly analyzed under this broader "course of conduct" perspective.
The liability of B and C in the drowning child hypothetical also
derives solely from the course of conduct of each with respect to the
child. Since c: the baby-sitter, has agreed to accept a particular responsi
bility for the child's welfare, it is appropriate to 'measure his criminal
liability for allowing the child to die in the context of the baby-sitting
activity.l44 Indeed, the relationship between the parents, the baby-sitter,
and the child clearly imposes an expected course of conduct on the babyexplained by a difference in defendant's conduct with respect to particular victims; it seems rather
that the prosecutor wanted to be sure that some manslaughter theory would hold up, and so he
proceeded not only on a conventional omissions theory but also on a wanton reckless act theory
(calling the act an assault), see Brief for Plaintiff at 36-37, Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass.
383, 55 N.E.2d 902 (1944), and on a misdemeanor manslaughter theory.
142. Welansky, 316 Mass. at 401, 55 N.E.2d at 912.
143. Professor Fletcher argues that there is a sharp distinction between causing harm through
affirmative acts (the liability for which he characterizes as "direct") and letting harm occur by failing
to intervene (the liability for which he ca1ls "derivative"). G. FLETCHER, supra note I, at 581-634.
He concedes, however, that at least some cases involving apparent failures to take action, such as
Welansky, can be treated as cases of affirmative risk creation. Id. at 621 n.30. He further
acknowledges that liability for "core" failures such as parents failing to feed their children are more
"direct" than "derivative." Id. at 596, 601.
144. Of course, if the baby-sitting agreement remains wholly executory-thc baby-sitter not
actually assuming responsibility from the child's parent notwithstanding his agreement-then it is
not appropriate to hold the baby-sitter criminally liable for the child's death, even if proper
performance would have prevented it. For example, if the parent hired the baby-sitter to meet him
at poolside, but the baby-sitter did not arrive as agreed, tHe baby-sitter could hardly be saddled with
homicide liability if tlte parent went on his way and the child fell into the pool and drowned. While
tlte sitter may have been delinquent in discharging his contractual responsibilities, hc simply cannot
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sitter. This expectation, by the parents and by society, imposes liability
when there is a faulty145 discharge of that assumed obligation. Thus, C's
liability arises from his conduct while baby-sitting, not his legal duty as a
baby-sitter, and ought so to be analyzed.
Similarly, the liability of B, the child's father, results from how he
conducted his parenting. His election to stand by while his daughter
drowned seems just as much a cause of her death as would his pushing
the child into the pool in the first place. This result derives from the
socially pervasive expectation that being a parent means acting to save
one's child. If the idea that parenting is a discrete course of conduct
which may be an appropriate basis for criminal liability seems odd,146
consider the case of Palmer v. State. 147 In Palmer, the Maryland Court
of Appeals affirmed a mother's manslaughter conviction where she per
mitted her lover to beat her child to death. The court noted the mother's
duty to care for and protect her child,148 but it did not analyze her crimi
nalliability for the child's death by focusing on that duty and then exam
ining whether she failed to perform the required acts. Rather, the court
looked to the whole of her parental conduct under the circumstances,
conduct it saw as generally limned by an "affirmative" obligation of
care. 149 Accordingly, the court held that the defendant's "conduct and
actions, ... compelling this poor little defenseless urchin to remain in an
environment where she was subjected to merciless, inhumane and inordi
nate brutality . . . displayed 'a wanton or reckless disregard for human
life.' ,,150
Of course, not every omitter has engaged in a course of conduct
relevant to an ensuing harm. A prime example is D in the drowning
child hypothetical, or Mrs. Pope in the case where the woman watched a
mother kill her child. 151 It is difficult to see the conduct of either, vis-a
vis the respective child victims, as anything more harm-connected than
bystanding. This is because we cannot say that society so expects the
bystander in such circumstances to prevent the child's death that the
be said as a matter of common sense to have thereby caused the child's death. See G. FLETCHER,

supra note 1, at 615-16.
145. "Fault" is used here in the causal sense, that is, as an interruption of normality represented
by the contractually based expectation of preventive conduct. See supra notes 95-96 and
accompanying text.
146. See. e.g.• G. FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 586-87. While Professor Fletcher sees a difference
between a parent's failure to provide proper care and affirmative risk creation, he nevertheless
concedes that the negligent parent's liability for resulting harm to his or her child is indistinguishable
from that of "affirmative" actors who cause harm. Id. at 596, 601.
147. 223 Md. 341, 164 A.2d 467 (1960).
148. Id. at 343, 164 A.2d at 468.
149. Id. at 351-52, 164 A.2d at 473.
150. Id.
151. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
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bystander's failure to do so "caused" the death. The lack of expected
interaction between the parties prevents us from concluding that the
bystander is causally responsible. However troubling from a moral per
spective, both D and Mrs. Pope seem free to mind their own business. In
our society, since bystanding, or mere presence, does not involve other
persons and thus cannot have causal impact on others, 152 we do not hold
this type of omitter criminally liable for preventable harms.
There is no precise formula in causal analysis for identifying what
course of conduct is relevant to a harm. But that indeterminacy is una
voidable, as there is no set way to cause particular harms. It may be a
single squeeze of a trigger;153 it may be driving a car over several
hours; 154 it may be operating a night club over several months or even
years. ISS The only common element of these causal sequences is that
when we examine all the defendant's conduct relevant to the harm in
question, we fairly can say, by reference to common sense, that the par
ticular series of acts caused the harm. Given the nature of the criminal
prohibition, we can be no more determinate; given the causation analysis
developed above, we need not be more determinate.
CONCLUSION

Criminal laws that prohibit individuals from causing certain harms
forbid particular results, not particular conduct. There is no reason
and no legal basis-for excluding the failures to prevent harms from the
law's ambit. While initially it may seem odd to speak of an omission as
the cause of a harm, there surely are omissions, like the failure to feed
one's child, that as a matter of common sense seem to have caused an
ensuing harm such as death. We have thus long accepted criminal pun
ishment of such omissions, but the limits of this criminal liability never
theless remain murky.
Conventional doctrine, in apparent adherence to the tentative sug
gestions of Lord Macaulay over 100 years ago,156 looks to a legal duty to
act to determine which omissions are criminal. This approach is mis
guided. The apparent determinacy offered by the term "legal duty" is
illusory, and the whole idea of using legal duty as a criterion for criminal
152. See supra note 100 and accompanying text. Of course, to the extent that attitudes change
and society does come to expect the bystander to rescue (at least where there is no reasonable risk or
cost to the rescuer), then D and Mrs. Pope could fairly be charged with causal responsibility for the
deaths that occurred as they stood by. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
154. E.g.• People v. Decina, 2 N.Y.2d 133, 138 N.E.2d 799, 156 N.Y.S.2d 558 (1956), discussed
supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
155. E.g.• Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383, 55 N.E.2d 902 (1944), discussed supra
notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 17.
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ity risks reaching wrong results because that term has no conceptual link
to the relevant criminal prohibition-the causation of particular harms.
Since we are punishing omitters for causing prohibited harms, the
sensible way to clarify the limits of such criminality, and thereby to pro
vide fair warning of which omissions are criminal, is by explicit reference
to causation. To be sure, such a measure of criminality is imprecise.
There are, however, commonly accepted notions of causation, related to
the paradigm of cause and effect, that provide clear basis for determining
which omissions caused a harm.·
While it is possible to identify these omissions by using a conven
tional approach that distinguishes between acts and omissions and then
relies on duties as criteria of criminality, this approach is subject to ana
lytic distortion and incorrect results. The better approach is to eschew
the doctrinal distinction between acts and omissions and instead simply
inquire whether the actor's conduct caused the harm proscribed. That,
after all, is the question.

